Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

A Hijacker’s Guide to the LPC Bus

2012; Springer Science+Business Media; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1007/978-3-642-29804-2_12

1611-3349

Johannes Winter, Kurt Dietrich,

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security

In this paper, we analyze the communication mechanism of trusted platform modules via the low-pin-count bus. While the trusted platform module is considered to be tamper resistant, the communication channel between this module and the rest of the trusted platform turns out to be comparatively insecure. It has been shown that passive attacks can be mounted on the TPM and its bus communication with fairly inexpensive equipment, however, similar active attacks have not been reported, yet. We tackle this problem and show how the communication on the LPC bus can be actively manipulated with simple and inexpensive equipment. Moreover, we show how our manipulation can be used to circumvent the chain of trust provided by trusted platforms.