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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning

2008; Wiley; Volume: 42; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.x

1468-0068

Jessica Brown,

Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

NoûsVolume 42, Issue 2 p. 167-189 Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning Jessica Brown, Jessica Brown University of St. AndrewsSearch for more papers by this author Jessica Brown, Jessica Brown University of St. AndrewsSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 May 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.xCitations: 109Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References Bach, Kent. 2005. ' The Emperor's New 'Knows'.' In Contextualism in Philosophy: On Epistemology, Language and Truth, Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds.), Oxford University Press. Brown, Jessica. 2005. ' Adapt or Die. Philosophical Quarterly Special Edition on Contextualism. Cohen, Stewart. 1988. 'How to be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91– 123. Cohen, Stewart. 1999. 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57– 89. Cohen, Stewart. 2000. 'Contextualism and Scepticism. Philosophical Issues 10: 94– 107. DeRose, Keith. 1992. 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 913– 29. DeRose, Keith. 1995. 'Solving the Sceptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104: 1– 52. Page references from K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds., Scepticism, OUP: Oxford, 1999, 183–219. DeRose, Keith. 2002. 'Assertion, Knowledge and Context. Philosophical Review. DeRose, Keith. 2004. 'The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVIII, 346– 50. Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. 2002. 'Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification', Phil. Review 111, 1: 67– 94. Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew. Forthcoming. ' Knowledge and the Purely Epistemic: in Favour of Pragmatic Encroachment. Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. OUP : Oxford. Hawthorne, John, and Stanley, Jason. Forthcoming. 'Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy. Hyman, John. 1999. 'How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 49: 433– 451. Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. 'The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Nous 35: 477– 514. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. 'Scepticism, Contextualism and Discrimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 138– 55 Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. OUP : Oxford. Stanley, Jason. 2007. 'Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests and Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75: 168– 72. Weatherson, Brian. 2003. ' Thoughts, Arguments and Rants: the Bank Cases.' http://www.brown.edu/Philosophy/tar/Archives/002074.html. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford : OUP Williamson, T. 2005. ' Contextualism, Subject-Sensitivity Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge,' Philosophical Quarterly Special Edition on Contextualism. Williamson, T. 2005a. ' Knowledge, Context and Agent's Point of View.' In Contextualism in Philosophy: On Epistemology, Language and Truth, Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds.), Oxford University Press. Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ' Knowledge and Scepticism.' In F. Jackson and M. Smith, Oxford Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Citing Literature Volume42, Issue2June 2008Pages 167-189 ReferencesRelatedInformation