How Can We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats?
2000; Wiley; Volume: 38; Issue: S1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00933.x
ISSN2041-6962
Autores Tópico(s)Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
ResumoThe Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 38, Issue S1 p. 121-148 How Can We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats? Keith DeRose, Keith DeRose Yale University Keith DeRose is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. His primary areas of research are epistemology, philosophy of language, and history of modern philosophy. Recent articles include “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by J. Greco and E. Sosa; “Conditional Assertions and ‘Bisquit’ Conditionals,” with Richard Grandy, Nous, 1999; and “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” Philosophical Perspectives, 1999. Along with Ted Warfield, he edited an anthology of recent work on Skepticism for Oxford University Press (1999).Search for more papers by this author Keith DeRose, Keith DeRose Yale University Keith DeRose is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. His primary areas of research are epistemology, philosophy of language, and history of modern philosophy. Recent articles include “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by J. Greco and E. Sosa; “Conditional Assertions and ‘Bisquit’ Conditionals,” with Richard Grandy, Nous, 1999; and “Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?” Philosophical Perspectives, 1999. Along with Ted Warfield, he edited an anthology of recent work on Skepticism for Oxford University Press (1999).Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00933.xCitations: 15 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Boghossian, Paul. 1997. What the externalist can know a priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 161–175. Brown, Jessica. 1995. The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 55: 149–156. 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Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Brains in a vat. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Skepticism, Edited by K. DeRose and T. Warfield, Oxford University Press, 1999. Smith, Peter. 1984. Could we be brains in a vat Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14: 115–123. Sosa, Ernest. 1999. How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 141–153. Stine, Gail. 1976. Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure. Philosophical Studies 29: 249–261. Reprinted in Skepticism, Edited by K. DeRose and T. Warfield, Oxford University Press, 1999. Warfield, Ted A. 1998. A priori knowledge of the world: Knowing the world by knowing our minds. Philosophical Studies 92: 127–147. Reprinted in Skepticism, Edited by K. DeRose and T. Warfield, Oxford University Press, 1999. Citing Literature Volume38, IssueS1Special Issue: Spindel Supplement: The Role of the Empirical (and of the A Priori) in EpistemologySpring 2000Pages 121-148 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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