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The Dependence of St. Thomas’ Psychology of Sensation upon his Physics

1962; St. Bonaventure University; Volume: 22; Issue: 1-2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/frc.1962.0004

1945-9718

Marius Schneider,

Medieval and Classical Philosophy

THE DEPENDENCE OF ST. THOMAS' PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION UPON HIS PHYSICS It seems apparent that there should be a relationship between St.Thomas’ psychology of the external senses and his physics. For since he considers the principle of sensitive life identical with the form of a living organism, his understanding of the soul should naturally be determined by his philosophical conception of corporeal beings as such,1 and the study of the soul should be, for him, a sub-discipline of physics.2 And since Thomistic psychology teaches that external sensation furnishes objective information about the characteristics of the animal’s physical environ­ ment,3 this psychology has to define the nature and the function of the traditional five senses in conformity with the assumed constitution of material reality. It must conceive them in such a way that the sense in act, i. e., sensation, can be the sensible in act, i. e., the existing material property of the corporeal being.4 This apparent dependence of Aquinas’ psychology of sensation upon his physics, however, does not seem to be taken into account in neo­ scholastic presentations of his psychological doctrine. Of course, decisive differences between the ancient and modern conceptions of the ma­ terial universe are recognized, and the justification of the 20th century view in this regard is, explicitly or implicitly, admitted. But this ad­ mission does not seem to affect the evaluation of the corresponding 1 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), L. V I, led. 1, n. 1159. 2 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Librum De Sensu et Sensato Commentarium (Taurini: Marietti, 1949), lect. 1, n. 2. In the following pages, this work is referred to as Sensus, followed b y the numbers of lecture and number. Cf. also S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Aristotelis Librurn De Anima Commentarium (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), L. 1, lect. 2, nn. 16; 23. Referred to as Anima followed b y numbers of book, lecture, and number. 3 Cf. Anima, 3, 6, 661: . . . (sensus) circa propria sensibilia semper verus est aut modicum habet de falsitate. 4 Cf. Anima, 3, 13, 788: . . . sensus in actu, et scientia vel intellectus in actu, sunt scibilia et sensibilia in actu. Sed potentia animae sensitivae, et id quod scire potest idest potentia intellectiva, non est ipsum sensibile vel scibile, sed est in potentia ad ipsa. Anima, 2, 23, 547: sensibile, quod est agens, facit ipsum (organum sensus) esse tale in actu, quale est sensibile, cum sit in potentia ad hoc. 3 4 M . S C H N E ID E R traditional psychology of the senses. A neo-Thomist m ay actually abandon Aquinas' view and propose that sensation "is relative,’’® presenting physical objects not “ as they are in themselves . . . but as they affect us,” ®and yet identify this modem scientific view with the “profound and difficult” Thomistic theory of sense knowledge, which theory is said to maintain that the senses ‘‘do not know objects or their qualities as they are in themselves.” 7 The more orthodox neo-Thomist, on the other hand, emphatically denies the validity of modem scientific assertions concerning the relati­ vity of external sensation, and he insists that St. Thomas’ teaching is independent of medieval experimental science. He endorses every aspect of Aquinas’ theory of knowledge, and he naturally “ combats and refutes the born enemies of this doctrine.” 8 According to his understanding of Thomistic psychology, every source of relativity must be eliminated from the explanation of the five senses, and the absolute objectivity of sense knowledge must be defended as the necessary requisite of all genuine intellectual knowledge. The intentional activity of the senses cannot be understood “ in terms of the organism’s vital reaction to the physical action of things, by virtue of the principle, quidquid recifitur ad modum recipientis recipitur,” nor by way of a “ recourse to a sensus agens whose function was to produce a sensible species through the physical action of things upon our organism.” For, according to Aquinas’ teaching, all such solutions deprive human knowledge of the only experimental contact possible between it and the physical universe b y which it is nourished; they destroy not only the objectivity of sensation...