Damascus on Trial
2011; Middle East Forum; Volume: 18; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
2767-049X
Autores Tópico(s)Global Peace and Security Dynamics
ResumoIn September 2008, the U.S. Federal Court in Washington, D.C, rendered a $4 1 3 million civil judgment against the government of Syria for its provision of support and material aid the killers of two American contractors in Iraq.1 appeal is pending, but should it lose, the victims' families will undoubtedly endeavor attach Syrian assets in the United States and abroad. Until now, with the exception of sanctions, financial designations, and periodic crossborder direct action, Washington has imposed little cost on Damascus for its consistent support for terrorist attacks in Iraq since the 2003 war. And while the financial implications of this court verdict are unlikely change Damascus's standing support for terrorism, it will impose an unprecedented price on Bashar al- Assad's increasingly reckless regime. SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENCY In December 2010, U.S. counterterrorism officials reported an uptick in the number of insurgents entering Iraq via Syria.2 It was the most significant reference a Syrian role in the movement of jihadists since December 2009 when Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki blamed Damascus for car bomb attacks that killed more than one hundred in Baghdad. But it was only the latest in a long series of U.S. complaints about Syrian provision of support Iraqi insurgents, a development that started even prior the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Indeed, as Washington was surging troops the region in 2003 in preparation for the blitz on Baghdad, Damascus was deploying its own counter- force fight the Americans. In the months leading up the invasion, the Assad regime allowed the establishment of an office across the street from the U.S. embassy in Damascus where insurgent hopefuls could sign up and get on a bus Baghdad for the opportunity repel the invaders.3 While brazen, Damascus's support and encouragement for Washington's enemies in Iraq came as little surprise. From the very start, Syria made no secret of its intent undermine the U.S. invasion. Just days after the start of military operations, for example, then-Syrian foreign minister Farouq Shara publicly announced that Syria's interest is see the invaders defeated in Iraq.4 The defeat of the U.S. project in Iraq was an interest Damascus shared with Tehran. So much so that, according then-Syrian vice president Abdel Halim Khaddam, on the eve of the invasion, the two countries forged an agreement encourage resistance against U.S. forces in Iraq.5 The Assad regime also took other steps including recruiting local staff - such as the Aleppobased militant Islamist cleric Abu al-Qaqa - help organize the infiltrations across Syrian territory.6 To ensure that these dangerous Islamists did not plant domestic roots that might threaten the Assad regime, security apparatus apparently documented the presence of these killers. Then-deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz displayed some of the evidence of this official Syrian complicity during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Scptember2003. Holding up passports belonging foreign fighters encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq, Wolfowitz said, A foreigner who came into Iraq on March 24* through Syria - not a Syrian, but through Syria. The entry permit on his passport said he came to, quote, volunteer for jihad. Here's another one, came into Iraq through Syria - same crossing point. The entry permit said, to join the Arab volunteers. And here's a third one that came in on April 7th. 7 Wolfowitz's statements were subsequently augmented by those of a dozen or so U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) flag officers, also focusing on the movement of jihadists through Syrian territory and Assad regime complicity in the endeavor. In March 2007, for example, CENTCOM revealed that training camps had been established on Syrian territory for Iraqi and foreign fighters.8 The most prominent of these statements, however, was issued by then-U. …
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