Players, Owners, and Contracts in the NFL: Why the Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy Cannot Escape the Clean Hands Doctrine
1999; Seattle University School of Law; Volume: 22; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
1078-1927
Autores Tópico(s)Sports Analytics and Performance
ResumoJim Blutarski was an All-American defensive end for three years at Faber College.' After his third year in college, Jim decided to forego his senior season and make himself eligible for the National Football League's college draft. Jim was chosen as the tenth pick in the first round of the draft by the New Orleans Saints and eventually signed a four year contract worth a total of $5.5 million. After three successful years starting at defensive end for the Saints, including two invitations to the Pro Bowl,2 Blutarski notified the Saints that unless they agreed to renegotiate his contract, he planned to hold out from playing in the upcoming football season. The Saints at this point had several options. If the Saints liked Blutarski's performance, they could negotiate with him and provide Blutarski with a raise, since the risk of losing his unique services for the year greatly outweighed the raise he was demanding. The Saints could also trade Blutarski to another team willing to deal with him for adequate compensation. If worse came to worst and the club found that it could not agree on new terms with Blutarski, and that it was no longer feasible to keep his services, the club would have to release Blutarski from his contract.
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