Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare
2003; The MIT Press; Volume: 83; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Military Strategy and Technology
ResumoTactics are employed against an asymmetric opponent in course of combat, but there can be no set of tactics checklists far asymmetric warfare, since each application is unique. Tactics are whatever we do against an asymmetric opponent when we arrange forces to counter that opponent. ANY DISCUSSION of doctrine and asymmetry must begin by acknowledging tension inherent between role of doctrine and nature of asymmetry in warfare. Doctrine should succinctly express collective wisdom about how U.S. Armed Forces conduct military operations. In 1923, historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote that the central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense-that is, action adapted to circumstance.1 While asymmetric warfare encompasses a wide scope of theory, experience, conjecture, and definition, implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar opponent, more difficult it is to anticipate his actions. If we knew in advance how an opponent planned to exploit our dissimilarities, we could develop specific doctrine to counter his actions. Against asymmetric opponents, doctrine should provide a way to think about asymmetry and an operational philosophy that would take asymmetry fully into account. One way to look at asymmetric warfare is to see it as a classic action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Our enemies study our doctrine and try to counter it. Any competent enemy will do unexpected, if he believes it will work. When we understand asymmetry, we counter it, and so forth. For example, if a potential opponent has biological weapons and United States does not, our preparation occurs across a technological, doctrinal, and operational range in terms of force protection, development of antidotes, and ability to attack or defeat enemy's delivery means, civil support, and so on. Such preparation serves to deter use of biological weapons, because opponent's original asymmetric advantage has been reduced. Unfortunately, uncertainty is inseparable from nature of warfare, and asymmetry increases uncertainty. Those who expect doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to provide solutions and checklists for action are soon disabused of that notion during actual operations. If and when enemy surprises us with a capability, our response is necessarily ad hoc and less effective. Depending on our preconceptions and ability to adapt, advantage an opponent enjoys might persist. Doctrine must prepare military force with a mindset to deal with uncertainty quickly and effectively. The Japanese navy's Long Lance torpedo illustrates our failure to deal with an asymmetric threat. Japan's Long Lance Torpedo In years between World War I and World War II, U.S. and Japanese navies pursued different technical and tactical solutions to naval surface combat. The U.S. Navy focused on very longrange daylight gunnery, supported by seaplane spotters and sophisticated analog computers.2 For computers to calculate a firing solution, firing ship had to maintain a steady course to allow computer to settle down and provide accurate data to turrets. The Japanese Navy developed Type 93 Long Lance torpedo that carried a large warhead and could travel 20,000 yards or more at speeds of up to 45 knots.3 The Japanese had an ideal fire-and-forget system. In consequence, Japanese trained to fight at night, with radically maneuvering destroyers and cruisers that fired torpedoes. For more than 2 years after U.S. Navy encountered Long Lance in early 1942, it did not appreciate weapon's capabilities. …
Referência(s)