The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination
1974; University of Chicago Law School; Volume: 41; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/1599097
ISSN1939-859X
Autores Tópico(s)Legal Systems and Judicial Processes
ResumoThe problems were so intractable that this time it really looked like Fred and Ginger might not get together. But then Fred sang Used to be Color Blind,' and suddenly we knew that everything would turn out all right. Unfortunately, life is not an Astaire-Rogers musical-let alone one called, as this one was, Carefree-and though not being colorblind may begin to solve some of our problems, it raises serious new ones. If we are to have even a chance of curing our society of the sickness of racism, we will need a lot more Black professionals. And whatever the complex of reasons, it seems we will not get them in the foreseeable future unless we take blackness into account and weight it positively when we allocate opportunities. But that must mean denying opportunities to some people solely because they were born White. Either way, it's no musical, and I confess I have trouble understanding the place of righteous indignation on either side of this wrenching moral issue.2 On the surface at least, the constitutional issue is also quite troubling. We would not allow a state university to favor applicants because they are White, not even an iota, whether it called the adjustment a quota, affirmative action, or anything else. To allow it to favor applicants because they are Black seems to be countenancing the most flagrant of double standards.3
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