Artigo Revisado por pares

Ankara's Baku-centered Transcaucasia policy: Has it failed?

1997; Middle East Institute; Volume: 51; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

ISSN

1940-3461

Autores

Suha Bölükbaşi,

Tópico(s)

Linguistics and Cultural Studies

Resumo

Turkey's initiatives towards Azerbaijan have been low-key because of Ankara's traditionally cautious diplomacy and its relatively modest short-term goals in the Transcaucasus. Yet the Turkish government's long-term goals are ambitious and include: 1) support for Azerbaijan's independence; 2) support for Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh; 3) prevention or restriction of Russian presence and influence in the region; 4) participation in Azerbaijani oil production and export; 5) a friendly-but not necessarily pan-Turkic-Azerbaijani administration. After the demise of the Soviet Union, many observers predicted that Turkey would compete with Russia and Iran for spheres of influence in the Turkic newly-independent states (NIS).' By late 1996, however, many of the same people were stating that Russia was now in a dominant position in its near abroad (the former Soviet republics) and that Turkey's economic, political and diplomatic resources had proved insufficient to allow it to play a major role in the region. Turkish diplomacy towards Azerbaijan, the most strategically located NIS for Turkey, also seemed to have failed to bring it the hoped-for political influence and economic benefits. Even during the pro-Turkish administration of Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey (1992-93), Turkey appeared to be unable to secure a strong foothold in Azerbaijan. The conclusion that Turkey's policy towards Azerbaijan and its neighbors has failed is both premature and based on mistaken assumptions. It has been only five years since the Soviet Union collapsed, and the NIS have just begun to stand on their own. Given the fact that Russian rule goes back to the early l9th century for Azerbaijan, it is clear that Ankara could not have achieved much in five years even if it had forcefully tried to replace Russia as the new Big Brother. Second, Turkey's inroads into Azerbaijan and Central Asia have actually been very low-key, and the Turks-despite their rhetoric that the 21st century would be a Turkic century2-have done their utmost not to challenge Russia directly and to avoid provoking their northern neighbor. This does not mean, however, that in the long-run the Turks do not desire to expand their influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia at the expense of Russia. Ankara considers Azerbaijan the most strategically located Turkic state: a gateway to Central Asia, a potential economic partner with huge petroleum resources, and a natural ally in containing Russian influence in the Transcaucasus. TURKISH POLICY VIS-A-VIS AZERBAIJAN This article will discuss Ankara's policy towards Azerbaijan taking into account the fact that Turkish initiatives toward Azerbaijan began only in 1991, and that Turkish goals vis-a-vis Baku were relatively modest.3 Turkey's policy toward Azerbaijan, in the past five years, has had a number of goals, including: Azerbaijan's independence; Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, the mostly Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan; a friendly, but not necessarily pan-Turkic, Azerbaijani administration; preventing or at least limiting Russian return to Transcaucasia; and participating in Azerbaijani oil production and the export of a significant portion of Azerbaijani oil through Turkish territory.4 Although it may appear contradictory, Ankara believes that to accomplish these goals, good relations with Russia are necessary, even though they may be difficult to maintain.5 Post-Soviet developments indicate that Ankara and Moscow have widely diverging views on the future of Azerbaijan. Russia would prefer Azerbaijan to have a pro-Moscow government which would provide military bases for Russia and accept its troops as peace-keepers in Karabakh. It also would like to foster Azerbaijani dependency on Russia by becoming the sole outlet for Azerbaijani oil exports and by forcing Azerbaijan to accept a partnership with Russia in the production of off-shore Azerbaijani oil in the Caspian Sea. …

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