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Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface

2012; Wiley; Volume: 87; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00563.x

1933-1592

Mark Kaplan,

Philosophy and History of Science

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 87, Issue 1 p. 1-35 Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface Mark Kaplan, Mark Kaplan Indiana UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Mark Kaplan, Mark Kaplan Indiana UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 03 February 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00563.xCitations: 9Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Austin, J. L. 1979. " Other Minds," in J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 3rd. ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (eds), Oxford University Press, pp. 76–116. Christensen, David. 2004. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press. Hawthorne, James and Bovens, Luc. 1999. "The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief", Mind, 108: 241–264. Jeffrey, Richard C. 1968. " Probable Knowledge," in Imre Lakatos (ed), The Problem of Inductive Logic. North-Holland Publishing Company, 166–80; reprinted in Jeffrey 1992, pp. 30-42. Jeffrey, Richard C. 1983. The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press. Jeffrey, Richard C. 1992. Probability and the Art of Judgment. Cambridge University Press. Kaplan, Mark. 1981. "A Bayesian Theory of Rational Acceptance," The Journal of Philosophy 78: 305–330. Kaplan, Mark. 1996. Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Kaplan, Mark. 2000. "To What Must an Epistemology be True? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 279–304. Kaplan, Mark. 2002. " Decision Theory and Epistemology," Paul Moser (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press, pp. 434–62. Kaplan, Mark. 2006a. " Deciding What You Know," in Erik J. Olsson (ed), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press, pp. 225–240. Kaplan, Mark. 2006b. " If You Know You Can't Be Wrong," in Stephen Hetherington (ed), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press, pp. 180–98. Kaplan, Mark. 2008. " Austin's Way with Skepticism," in John Greco (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press, pp. 348–71. Kaplan, Mark. 2009. " Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism," in Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds) Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press, pp. 122–39. Kaplan, Mark. 2010. " John Langshaw Austin," in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds) The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 798–810. Kyburg Jr, Henry. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan University Press. Maher, Patrick. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge University Press. Makinson, D. C. 1965. "The Paradox of the Preface," Analysis 25: 205–7. Roorda, Jonathan. 1997. "Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief," The Journal of Philosophy 94: 126–55. Savage, Leonard J. 1972. The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd ed. Dover Publishing. Sturgeon, Scott. 2008. "Reason and the Grain of Belief," Noûs 42: 139–65. Weintraub, Ruth. 2001. " The Lottery: a Paradox Regained and Resolved," Synthese 129: 439–449. Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press. Citing Literature Volume87, Issue1July 2013Pages 1-35 ReferencesRelatedInformation