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Mixed Signals: Rational Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation

2001; RELX Group (Netherlands); Linguagem: Inglês

10.2139/ssrn.278277

1556-5068

W. Bradley Wendel,

Philosophy and History of Science

The title of this paper is taken from the "signaling" model of social norms developed by Eric Posner in his book, Law and Social Norms. Posner's book is interesting, not because it is the best theoretical account of social norms, but because it is an object demonstration of a fundamental paradox confronting law-and-economics theories: If they remain true to their methodological commitments, such as the assumption that people are purely self-interested utility maximizers, they fail to provide an adequate account of human behavior. If, on the other hand, they relax these strictures, they threaten the distinctiveness of the rational-choice approach, which has been the key to the tremendous popularity law-and-economics in the legal academy. The Posner book is a point of departure for my argument, because I think it nicely illustrates the predicament for the law and economics movement, which is currently riven with internal disagreement about the extent to which theoretical assumptions should move beyond the austere presuppositions of neoclassical rational-choice theory.