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Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?

2011; Wiley; Volume: 47; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00833.x

1468-0068

Mark Schroeder,

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

NoûsVolume 47, Issue 3 p. 409-430 ARTICLE Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce? Mark Schroeder, Mark Schroeder University of Southern CaliforniaSearch for more papers by this author Mark Schroeder, Mark Schroeder University of Southern CaliforniaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 19 October 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00833.xCitations: 13Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Bennett, Jonathan [2003]. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, Simon [1988]. 'Attitudes and Contents.' Ethics 98(3): 501–517. Blackburn, Simon [1993]. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, Simon [1998]. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunaway, William [2010]. 'Expressivism and Minimalism.' Philosophical Studies 151(3): 351–371. Edgington, Dorothy [1995]. 'On Conditionals.' Mind 104: 235–329. Egan, Andy [2007]. 'Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error.' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2): 205–219. Gibbard, Allan [1990]. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gibbard, Allan [2003]. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Groenendijk, J., and M. Stokhof [1991]. 'Dynamic Predicate Logic.' Linguistics and Philosophy 14: 39–100. Hamblin [1973]. 'Questions in Montague English.' Foundations of Language 10: 41–53. Horgan, Terry, and Mark Timmons [2006]. ' Cognitivist Expressivism.' In Horgan and Timmons, eds., Metaethics After Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kamp, Hans [1981]. ' A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation.' In Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Part 1. J. Groenendijk, T. Janssen and M. Stokhof, eds., Mathematic Center, Amsterdam: 277–322. Price, Huw [1983]. 'Does 'Probably' Modify Sense?' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61(4): 396–408. Schnieder, Benjamin [2010]. 'Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals.' Philosophical Quarterly 60(4): 601–615. Schroeder, Mark [2008] Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schroeder, Mark [2010a]. Noncognitivism in Ethics. New York: Routledge. Schroeder, Mark [2010b]. ' How to be an Expressivist About Truth.' In Cory Wright and Nikolaj Jang Peterson, eds., New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 282–298. Smith, Michael [2001]. 'Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Noncognitivism in Ethics.' Ratio 14(2): 93–115. Stevenson, C.L. [1937]. ' The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.' Reprinted in Stevenson, Facts and Values, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Unwin, Nicholas [1999]. 'Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.' The Philosophical Quarterly 49(196): 337–352. Unwin, Nicholas [2001]. 'Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic.' The Philosophical Quarterly 51(202): 60–75. Citing Literature Volume47, Issue3September 2013Pages 409-430 ReferencesRelatedInformation