Blue Force Tracking: A Subset of Combat Identification

2004; The MIT Press; Volume: 84; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

ISSN

0026-4148

Autores

Kurt E. J. Dittmer,

Tópico(s)

Military Defense Systems Analysis

Resumo

AS THE ARMY transforms to lighter, leaner, more lethal future combat systems, Army leaders can draw significant parallels from air combat when considering new combat identification (CID) capabilities. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has had Blue Force Tracking (BFT) and Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) for decades. Army Transformation planners should consider moving CID out of oversight of Joint Staff Command and Control Functional Control Board to Force Application Functional Control Board. Identification, Friend or Foe The British developed an electronic identification device for aircraft during World War II to provide a reply to a ground radar's interrogation.' The device, appropriately named identification, friend or foe (IFF), was a combination transmitter and receiver (called a transponder) that used a unique signal to identify aircraft. Because only or combatant aircraft were flying over England, any aircraft not squawking was probably a German combatant (or a combatant with malfunctioning equipment). With a lethal envelope of weapons in visual arena, verification during engagement could reduce chance that a aircraft would be shot down. In today's air combat environment, airspace contains more commercial and private aircraft, all equipped with IFF transponders, which routinely transit airspace or approach combat zones. Because range of air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons systems has expanded, lethal engagement envelopes have also expanded well beyond visual ranges, and need for identifying friend from foe has required more capabilities. Transponder modes 1, 2, and 3 on all U.S. military aircraft provide aircraft, flight, or other group or class information. Mode 4, an encrypted code, can only be interrogated by systems with current cryptography codes.2 Information from these IFF interrogators and transponders feeds ground and air surveillance radar picture for Joint BFSA (JBFSA) of airspace. Airborne fighters with an advanced interrogation capability can display a piece of air picture, although their field of regard limits them. A fighter's radar typically only looks in front of aircraft, and its displays merely overlay transponder displays with raw radar returns. If an IFF transponder system is inoperative, interrogation will come up negative, indicating lack of friendly (LOF), and radar return-the IFF-with wrong code goes into a category called unknown. With access to an enemy's IFF and codes, interrogation of a foe and a subsequent positive response will indicate presence of enemy (POE). This does not complete for engagement, however. The POE identification must be further assessed to determine whether aircraft present is a combatant with hostile intent (that is, whether a MiG-29 identified is trying to destroy or trying to defect). Combat Identification JBFSA interrogation and force response has nothing to do with identifying personnel or equipment; it is only cooperative identification. JBFSA feeds information into CID by providing information on troops, but it is really only a subset of overall capabilities required to achieve true CID. The 2001 CID Capstone Requirements Document defines CID as the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in joint battlespace to extent that high confidence, timely application of military options, and weapons resources can occur.3 This definition points toward fundamental objective of destroying enemy, end result of closing links of a kill chain. The USAF talks about a kill chain as a set of capabilities to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess hostile aircraft. In kill-chain sequence, find encompasses locating friendlies, enemies, and neutrals. Fix is process of characterizing potential targets with sufficient fidelity for proper weaponeering and engagement. …

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