INTEREST‐RELATIVE INVARIANTISM AND KNOWLEDGE FROM IGNORANCE
2012; Wiley; Volume: 93; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01414.x
ISSN1468-0114
Autores Tópico(s)Free Will and Agency
ResumoAbstract The principle of Counter‐Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single‐premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest‐Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter‐Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of his view; or (ii) admit into his epistemology an IRI‐specific novel brand of Gettier case; or (iii) abandon Counter‐Closure.
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