Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done? A Computable General Equilibrium-Game Theoretical Approach
2010; Wiley; Volume: 33; Issue: 11 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01302.x
ISSN1467-9701
Autores Tópico(s)Economic Theory and Policy
ResumoThe World EconomyVolume 33, Issue 11 p. 1486-1516 Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done? A Computable General Equilibrium–Game Theoretical Approach Antoine Bouët, Antoine Bouët International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC, and Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques/Université de Pau, France,Search for more papers by this authorDavid Laborde, David Laborde International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DCSearch for more papers by this author Antoine Bouët, Antoine Bouët International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC, and Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques/Université de Pau, France,Search for more papers by this authorDavid Laborde, David Laborde International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DCSearch for more papers by this author First published: 25 November 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01302.xCitations: 6 The authors thank Jean-Christophe Bureau, Lionel Fontagné, Gaspar Frontini, Tom Hertel, Sébastien Jean, Will Martin, participants of the 2004 GTAP Conference in Washington DC and the September 2004 AFSE Congress in Paris and two anonymous referees who provided comments on an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract We use a world computable general equilibrium model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. 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