Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs
2005; The MIT Press; Volume: 85; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Information and Cyber Security
ResumoIMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE devices (IEDs) are among deadliest weapons coalition forces face in Iraq, and defeating their use by insurgents is both essential and extremely challenging. Thus far, U.S. defense science and technology communities have focused on developing technical solutions to IED threat. However, IEDs are a product of human ingenuity and human social organization. If we understand social context in which they are invented, built, and used we will have an additional avenue for defeating them. As U.S. Army Brigadier General Joseph Votel, head of Pentagon's Joint IED Task Force, noted, commanders should focus less on bomb than bombmaker. (1) A shift in focus from IED technology to IED makers requires examining social environment in which bombs are invented, manufactured, distributed, and used. Focusing on bombmaker requires understanding four elements that make IED use possible in Iraq: knowledge, organization, material, and surrounding population. Knowledge The IEDs that are killing Americans in Iraq were not imported from abroad. Saddam Hussein's regime designed them. The insurgency's bombmakers are mostly former members of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Mukhabarat. (2) The IIS unit called M-21 (also known as Al Ghafiqi Project) operated a laboratory that designed IEDs. Bomb manufacturing at M-21 was a collaborative enterprise: No one person constructed an entire explosive device alone.... An improvised explosive device began in chemistry department which developed explosive materials for device. The electronics department prepared timers and wiring of IED and mechanical department produced igniters and designed (3) M-21 designed a number of clever ways to conceal explosives, including in books, briefcases, belts, vests, drink containers, car seats, floor mats, and facial tissue boxes. (4) M-21 also produced manuals on how to conduct roadside ambushes using IEDs; how to construct IEDs from conventional high explosives and military munitions; and how to most effectively take out a convoy by disguising an IED. (5) The IIS M-21 unit is a key reason Iraqi insurgency is so adept at constructing IEDs. They provided the blueprints of postwar insurgency that U.S. now faces in Iraq. (6) Beginning in September 2003, IEDs became more sophisticated, evolving from simple suicide attacks to more complex remote-control, vehicle-borne IEDs and daisy-chained IEDs using tripwires. (7) Such a rapid increase in technological sophistication indicates infusion of expert knowledge into process of building and deploying IEDs. The increased sophistication of IEDs over time also indicates that their design and construction has become a specialized function within insurgency, rather than a dispersed function. Functional specialization of IED manufacturing and emplacement suggests there are relatively few bombmakers. Indeed, British Army believes insurgents have a small number of bombmakers who are involved in designing and mass-producing IEDs. (8) General Martin Dempsy, commander of V Corps' 1st Armored Division agrees: I think that there is an element of central planning and central training and central supplying for improvised explosive devices. (9) If bombmaking is a specialized function, coalition forces can take advantage of this in two major ways. First, if bombmakers are captured or killed, their knowledge dies with them. Although manuals can be instructive, knowledge gained through years of experience is not easy to reproduce through written instructions. Thus, removing bombmakers would weaken insurgents' ability to mass-produce bombs. Second, specialization of function makes those who plan, transport, and detonate bombs dependent on those who build them. Although insurgency is organized in cells, multiple members of each cell must know identity of bombmaker in order to retain access if cell members are killed. …
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