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The Engine That Could: 75 Years of Values-Driven Change at Cummins Engine Company

1999; Johns Hopkins University Press; Volume: 40; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/tech.1999.0117

1097-3729

Albert Churella,

Economic Growth and Productivity

Reviewed by: The Engine That Could: 75 Years of Values-Driven Change at Cummins Engine Company* Albert Churella (bio) The Engine That Could: 75 Years of Values-Driven Change at Cummins Engine Company. By Jeffrey L. Cruikshank and David B. Sicilia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1997. Pp. ix+587; illustrations, notes/reference, index. $45. “Selling engines to engine-makers” may seem a dangerous mission for a company, something that Cummins Engine Company president Irwin Miller freely admitted (p. 511). However, The Engine That Could shows that Cummins survived and often prospered under that very strategy. Historians of technology and business have shown increasing interest in small to midsized businesses, flexible manufacturing techniques, and corporate adaptability. The Cummins story revolves around these issues, and also focuses on such themes as technology transfer, family management, wartime production and reconversion, business-government relations, and international competitiveness. In addition, the book delves inside the black box of diesel engine technology to illustrate the incremental nature of product and process innovation at Cummins. Cummins traces its lineage to 1919, when Clessie Cummins persuaded his employer, W. G. Irwin (part of the wealthy and locally prominent Sweeney-Irwin-Miller family), to bankroll diesel engine production. Thereafter, family connections and proprietary management became a tradition at Cummins for decades. Close family ties enabled the company to [End Page 681] weather business cycles. Just as the family played an active role in the Columbus, Indiana, community, so too did the company, which built goodwill through philanthropy and an ongoing commitment to local production and employment. During the early 1920s, the company’s first attempt to build small farm diesels under license ended in failure—an example of the perils of technological transfer. This experience so soured Cummins on licensing arrangements that the company moved quickly to develop its own proprietary technology and, more gradually, to integrate manufacturing and distribution capabilities. Cummins did develop improved engine designs and, more important, Clessie Cummins served as a tireless promoter, installing diesels in touring cars, Indianapolis 500 racers, buses, and trucks. During the 1930s Cummins experienced a surge in orders for truck engines. For the next five decades the fortunes of Cummins were tied to trucking and to the regulatory forces that shaped that industry. In the postwar period, Cummins focused on its core diesel product line and developed closer ties with independent distributors. The company also replaced inventor-entrepreneurs with professional managers and redefined the managerial structure from an ad hoc system to an organizational bureaucracy. Cummins was still in the tenuous position of selling engines to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), companies that might choose to bypass Cummins by integrating their own manufacturing operations. To combat this threat, Cummins attempted (unsuccessfully) to merge with OEM White Motor Company, briefly diversified into unrelated industries, established offshore manufacturing capabilities, and expanded the range and capabilities of its engine models. In order to produce these new models, Cummins opened branch plants and entered into joint-venture arrangements. During the 1970s Cummins was caught off guard by the energy crisis and by stringent federal air-quality regulation. And, during the 1980s, Cummins reeled as Japanese manufacturers—notably Komatsu, with whom Cummins had signed a licensing agreement in 1961—used more efficient manufacturing techniques, higher quality, and lower prices to invade the company’s traditional markets. Cummins responded by cutting its own prices and creating a “total quality system” of manufacturing, based extensively on the Japanese model. At the same time, Cummins rebuffed two takeover attempts and attempted to protect itself from further incursions (and generate additional capital) by creating, in 1990, a community of ownership agreements with Ford, Tenneco, and Kubota. Jeffrey L. Cruikshank and David B. Sicilia studied Cummins at the request of that company’s management, and the book’s emphasis on consensus, corporate culture, and values-driven change clearly reflects the target audience. Still, the authors had full access to corporate records and conducted extensive interviews with company officials. These individuals undoubtedly wanted to see their views expressed on paper, and this contributes [End Page 682] to the book’s length—streamlining the 1973–1994 period would help bring the Cummins story into sharper focus. These concerns reflect the intent...