Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II
2012; United States Army War College; Volume: 42; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0031-1723
Autores Tópico(s)Military, Security, and Education Studies
ResumoCommand Culture: Officer Education in U.S. Army and German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and Consequences for World War II by Jorg Muth Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2011 367 pages $29.95 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Command Culture is provocative book. It will probably elicit shrieks of outrage from some readers and grudging praise from others intimately familiar with both US Army and German Armed Forces. In brief--kurz um, as Muth would say in his native German--compares German and American systems of selecting, educating, and promoting military officers from 1901 to World War II and finds German system superior. He is particularly critical of American cadet training at West Point and officer education at Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He much prefers German emphasis on acculturation resulting in bonding called Kameradschaft. This reviewer's initial impression was that Muth is brash young German academic freely and happily tossing intellectual hand grenades into American Officers' Mess. As one carefully studies his thesis and sources, however, it becomes apparent that Muth has done his homework. His impressive research ranged widely and plunged deeply into German and American archives and secondary sources. His 217-page narrative is supported at every turn by 95 pages with 977 endnotes. His research included interviews with American scholars Edward M. Coffman and Dennis Showalter, who suggested that he address possible charge of bias for German system. He took that advice and explains in an Afterword his lifelong fascination with US Army begun as American soldiers allowed the enthusiastic German kid to climb on military equipment in training area near small town where he grew up. A later highpoint was his participation in 2005 West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. He praises teaching and dedication he experienced, calling West Point a magical place. Gratitude, however, did not soften objectivity as he reminds us: History is by its very nature harsh profession. Indeed! He writes, The US Army did not have good officers because of West Point but in spite of it. During these first decades of twentieth century, Academy presents spectacle of monstrous waste of youthful enthusiasm. And despite lack of evidence supporting utility of such monstrous waste, institution consistently resisted change. He is particularly critical of hazing of plebes (first-year cadets) by other cadets, pointing to immaturity of those doing hazing, cruel and mindless practices, and memorization of nonsense plebe knowledge (instead of useful military information). He has similarly sceptical view of relationship between tactical officers and cadets in their charge, regarding it as martinet to tin soldiers. His point is that neither harassment by other cadets nor nagging by tactical officers (some soldiers would properly identify both as chickenshit), promotes what Germans prize most in acculturation of German cadets and junior officers: Kameradschaft. …
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