Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
2013; Econometric Society; Volume: 8; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.3982/te1207
ISSN1933-6837
Autores Tópico(s)Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
ResumoTheoretical EconomicsVolume 8, Issue 3 p. 653-700 Open Access Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking Guillermo L. Ordoñez, Guillermo L. Ordoñez Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania; [email protected] I especially thank Andy Atkeson, Christian Hellwig, David K. Levine, Gadi Barlevy (a co-editor), and two anonymous referees. For useful comments and discussions, I also thank Fernando Alvarez, V. V. Chari, Johannes Horner, Hugo Hopenhayn, Narayana Kocherlakota, David Lagakos, Robert Lucas, Lee Ohanian, Chris Phelan, Larry Samuelson, Rob Shimer, Nancy Stokey, Ivan Werning, Bill Zame, and seminar participants at Arizona State, Brown, Chicago Economics, Chicago Booth, Columbia, CREI-Pompeu Fabra, Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and Minneapolis, Harvard, Iowa, ITAM, LSE, Minnesota, MIT, NYU Stern, Princeton, UCLA, Washington University in St. Louis, Wharton, Yale, LAMES-LACEA Meetings in Rio de Janeiro, and SED Meetings at MIT. I also thank Kathy Rolfe and Joan Gieseke for excellent editorial assistance. The usual waiver of liability applies.Search for more papers by this author Guillermo L. Ordoñez, Guillermo L. Ordoñez Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania; [email protected] I especially thank Andy Atkeson, Christian Hellwig, David K. Levine, Gadi Barlevy (a co-editor), and two anonymous referees. For useful comments and discussions, I also thank Fernando Alvarez, V. V. Chari, Johannes Horner, Hugo Hopenhayn, Narayana Kocherlakota, David Lagakos, Robert Lucas, Lee Ohanian, Chris Phelan, Larry Samuelson, Rob Shimer, Nancy Stokey, Ivan Werning, Bill Zame, and seminar participants at Arizona State, Brown, Chicago Economics, Chicago Booth, Columbia, CREI-Pompeu Fabra, Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago and Minneapolis, Harvard, Iowa, ITAM, LSE, Minnesota, MIT, NYU Stern, Princeton, UCLA, Washington University in St. Louis, Wharton, Yale, LAMES-LACEA Meetings in Rio de Janeiro, and SED Meetings at MIT. I also thank Kathy Rolfe and Joan Gieseke for excellent editorial assistance. The usual waiver of liability applies.Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 September 2013 https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1207Citations: 20 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. 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DOI: 10.1086/261973 Citing Literature Volume8, Issue3September 2013Pages 653-700 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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