The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws
2012; Wiley; Volume: 49; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1744-1714.2012.01134.x
ISSN1744-1714
Autores Tópico(s)Regulation and Compliance Studies
ResumoAmerican Business Law JournalVolume 49, Issue 2 p. 325-368 Original Article The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws Philip M. Nichols, Philip M. Nichols Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics The Wharton School of the University of PennsylvaniaThis article was supported by a research grant from the Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics. Marisa Schoen and Jeffrey Johnson provided valuable research assistance for this article. An earlier version of this article was selected as a finalist for the 2011 Holmes-Cardozo Award for outstanding scholarship by the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.Search for more papers by this author Philip M. Nichols, Philip M. Nichols Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics The Wharton School of the University of PennsylvaniaThis article was supported by a research grant from the Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics. Marisa Schoen and Jeffrey Johnson provided valuable research assistance for this article. An earlier version of this article was selected as a finalist for the 2011 Holmes-Cardozo Award for outstanding scholarship by the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.Search for more papers by this author First published: 22 May 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.2012.01134.xCitations: 21 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Footnotes 1 See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes , 43 J. Bus. Ethics 275, 276 (2003) (reporting that the World Bank considers corruption the greatest impediment to global commercial relationships); Margaret McNeil & Kerry Pedigo, Western Australian Managers Tell Their Stories: Ethical Challenges in International Business Operations , 30 J. Bus. Ethics 305, 306 (2001) (discussing surveys that report that bribe requests are the most frequent ethical problem faced by Australian and U.S. businesspeople). 2 See, e.g., George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, The Economics of Corruption: An Overview , in Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance 1, 1 ( George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta eds., 2002); Daniel Kaufman, Back to Basics—Ten Myths About Governance and Corruption , Fin. & Dev., Sept. 2005, at 41, 41. As recently as a decade ago, scholars noted that research on corruption "is very much in its nascent stage." J. Egardo Campos et al., Corruption and Its Implications for Investment , in Corruption: The Boom and Bust of East Asia 11, 21 ( J. Edgardo Campos ed., 2001). 3 David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption) , 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 593, 595 (2000); see also David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem , 41 Cornell Int'l L.J. 307, 312–13 (2008) (revisiting the paradox of corruption). 4 Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization , 28 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 305, 321–22 (1997). 5Sura 28:77 (Muhammad Marmaduke Pickhall trans., 1930); see also Mohammad Saeed et al., International Marketing Ethics from an Islamic Perspective: A Value-Maximization Approach , 32 J. Bus. Ethics 127, 136 (2001) (stating that because of a core "regard for the societal welfare … Islam condemns bribery unequivocally in all its forms whether it represents protecting business interests and/or securing greater profits"). 6Deuteronomy 16:19 (English Standard Version); see also Menachem Elon, The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law and Its Application in the State of Israel—Part IV , 4 Isr. L. Rev. 80, 99 (1969) (stating that the bribery laws of Israel are based on strong Jewish proscriptions of bribery); John T. Noonan Jr., Bribery , 2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 741, 745–46 (1986) (describing an "intense spiritual hatred of bribery" in Christian literature). 7 Harbans Singh, Degh, Tegh, Faith: Socio-Economic & Religio-Political Fundamentals of Sikhsim 141 (1986). 8 U. Dhammaratana, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism , in The Social Philosophy of Buddhism 1, 18 ( Samdhong Rinpoche et al. eds., 1972). 9 Hess & Dunfee, supra 3, at 613 (citing John T. Noonan, Bribes 702 (1984)); Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute , 31 Mich. J. Int'l L. 385, 391 (2010). 10The clarity of the rules does not, of course, ensure that they are correctly perceived. Chong-Yeong Lee and Hideki Yoshihara note the difference between perception and reality and report that a number of international businesspeople mistakenly believe that bribery is a normalized practice in other countries. Chong-Yeong Lee & Hideki Yoshihara, Business Ethics of Korean and Japanese Managers , 16 J. Bus. Ethics 7, 10–11 (1997). 11 Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory , 19 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 252, 260–65 (1994). 12 Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Ties that Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics 43–44 (1999). 13 Id. at 229–30. They also suggest that corruption usually violates a hypernorm providing for "a universal right to political participation." Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas J. Donaldson, Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global Bribery Viewed Through the Lens of Integrative Social Contact Theory , in The Blackwell Guide to Business Ethics 61, 74 ( Norman E. Bowie ed., 2002). 14 Andrew Spicer, The Normalization of Corrupt Business Practices: Implications for Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) , 88 J. Bus. Ethics 833, 837–38 (2009). Spicer does not take issue with Donaldson and Dunfee's framework; rather, he uses their extensive analysis of corruption, which goes beyond simply finding corruption an illegitimate violation of a hypernorm, as an opening for his own exploration of the authenticity of local norms regarding corruption. Id. at 837. 15 See, e.g., Dunfee & Donaldson, supra 13, at 74. Donaldson and Dunfee acknowledge that in some instances the admonition to not pay bribes is an incomplete solution and recommend a longer-term approach that combines "business pressure, legal enforcement, and political will." Donaldson & Dunfee, supra 12, at 230. 16 See Kaufman, supra 2, at 41 (noting that the majority of corruption research is empirical studies of its effects). 17 E.g., Padideh Ala'i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement , 6 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 259, 273–75 (2008); Beverly Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument , 14 Dick. J. Int'l L. 207, 208, 226 (1996); see also Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption in International Business , 17 J. Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 108, 109–10 (1998) (describing the positive effect that the change in emphasis has had on research). 18 Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business—The Dawn of a New Era , 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 349, 364 (2000). But see Chantal Thomas, Does the "Good Governance Policy" of the International Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of Democracy? , 14 Conn. J. Int'l L. 551, 560 (1999) (lamenting the economic focus of the international financial institutions). 19 See, e.g., Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption 38–48 (1988) (discussing and explaining the manners in which corruption causes misallocations of goods and services, the generation of negative externalities, inefficiencies, distortion of incentives, the creation of corrupt rents, popular alienation and disenfranchisement, distortions in administration and bureaucracy, and public outrage, at the societal level); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy 58–134 (2007) (discussing voluminous empirical research on the damage at the societal level by corruption, developing new models to explain the relationships between corruption and societal damage, and developing and testing a model to show that corruption is not simply a transfer of rents); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform 9–26 (1999) (discussing and explaining how corruption leads to regulatory distortion and evasion, the entanglement of government and organized crime, market distortion and inefficiency, bureaucratic distortion and malfeasance, systemic degradation, and the delegitimization of and disengagement from government). 20 Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony , 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 419, 446 (1999). Bill Shaw points out that the effects of bribery are particularly devastating for emerging economies. Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable , 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 689, 691 (2000). 21 Hess & Dunfee, supra 3, at 595. 22 See infra Part II. 23 See infra Part III. 24 See infra Part IV. 25Arnold Heidenheimer suggests three broad categories of attempts to define public sector corruption: public office–centered, moral and public interest–centered, and market-based types of definitions. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis 4 (1970); see also Maryvonne Génaux, Social Sciences and the Evolving Concept of Corruption , 42 Crime L. & Soc. Change 13, 13–16 (2004) (discussing the continued relevance of Heidenheimer's categorization). 26Joseph Nye first offered a form of this definition. See Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis , 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417, 419 & 10 (1967); see also Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders , 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 413, 417 (2007) (referring to Nye's as the "classic definition"). This general definition is used by nongovernment organizations such as Transparency International, which defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption , Transparency Int'l, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Oct. 1, 2011), and the World Bank, which defines corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain," World Bank Grp., Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank , World Bank, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (emphasis removed). This definition allows for a general discussion of corruption; the legality or illegality of a particular action depends on the precise wording of the criminal laws of a government having jurisdiction over that action. 27 James P. Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be Capped , 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 498, 504 (1998); see also James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption , 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 125, 182–83 (2009) (describing other permutations of corruption). 28 Rose-Ackerman, supra 19, at 93; Stephen F. Smith, Essay, Proportional Mens Rea , 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 142 (2009) (emphasizing that the U.S. federal bribery statute requires mens rea for an act to rise from a gratuity to a bribe). 29 See Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy 20–21 (2005) (bemoaning the confusion of the terms in corruption literature). 30 See Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization , 18 J.L. & Econ. 587, 591–99 (1975) (distinguishing private sector corruption from public sector corruption). 31 See Blake E. Ashforth et al., Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption , 33 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 670, 672–76 (2008) (discussing research on the harms of private sector corruption at the firm, industry, national, and systems levels). 32 See Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending , 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1273, 1370 (1983) ("When an official is bribed, there is an immediate harm to the legitimacy of government regardless of the substantive ends the bribe is intended to achieve."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction , 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 427, 463 (1998) ("The absence of exit or other forms of loss protection (i.e., diversification, insurance, etc.) provides some justification for less tolerance for public corruption relative to private corruption."). 33 See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 386 (1968); Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption , 8 Am. Behav. Scientist 8, 11 (1964). 34See Francis T. Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery , 93 J. Pol. Econ. 760, 762–66 (1985), for an example of this type of analysis. 35 Rose-Ackerman, supra 19, at 16. 36 Robert Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India , 18 J. Dev. Stud. 287, 287 (1982). 37 Robert Wade, Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Populist Anarchy: An Indian Case , 14 J. Dev. Econ. 285, 286-87 (1984); Wade, supra 36, at 313–14. 38 Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC's: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency , 34 Kyklos: Int'l Rev. for Soc. Sci. 448, 448–55 (1981). 39 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank , 15 Dick. J. Int'l L. 451, 454–55 (1997). 40 Michael R. Caputo, Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis: Optimal Control Theory and Applications ix (2005). 41 See World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank 14–15 (Sept. 1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf (stating that, by using a dynamic analysis, what appears to be a short-term gain can be shown to impose tremendous costs in the long run); Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary , 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 95, 112 (1999) ("[P]resent corruption decreases future productivity, thereby reducing dynamic efficiency."). 42 See Alexandra Addison Wrage, Bribery and Extortion: Undermining Business, Governments, and Security 31 (2007) ("Representatives of multinational companies operating overseas describe a consistent trend. When these companies pay bribes to resolve some short-term nuisance, they report that the bribe-taker returns, the word spreads, and the demands multiply."); Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti-Corruption Efforts Paying Off? International and National Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region and Their Impact on India and Multinational Corporations , 31 U. Haw. L. Rev. 59, 84 (2009) (discussing revelations of corporate counsels that paying bribes engenders a reputation that leads to greater bribe demands); Hess & Dunfee, supra 3, at 609 (reporting discussions with business leaders regarding value of good reputation with respect to corruption); Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , 33 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 83, 86–87 (2008) (describing reputational costs experienced by firms that have paid bribes). 43 Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy , 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 389, 444 (1997). 44 Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt? , 41 Geo. J. Int'l L. 861, 887 (2010); see also Krever, supra 42, at 87 ("Moreover, an official who knows payments have been made in the past can increase bureaucratic interference to engender further bribes."). 45 Daniel Kaufman & Shang-Jin Wei, Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2254, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629191. 46 Id. at 3. The Stackelberg Game is a non-zero-sum, two-player game in which the players do not have information about each other's strategies. M. Simaan & J.B. Cruz, Jr., On the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games , 11 J. Optimization Theory & Applications 533, 534 (1973). 47 Kaufman & Wei, supra 45, at 5. 48 Id. 49 Rose-Ackerman, supra 19, at 92–93. 50 See Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy , 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 287, 310 (2000) (using the slang term). 51 Rose-Ackerman, supra 19, at 113. 52 Ronald MacLean Abaroa, Towards 2005: Profits, People, and the Future of the Regulatory State in the Free Market Model , 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 131, 136 (1999); see also Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa's Development , 20 B.U. Int'l L.J. 293, 343 (2002) (emphasizing the moral obligation of government to fight corruption given this asymmetry). 53Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson observed these market forces in operation: "These results suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, demanding higher bribes (for a given public service) from firms that can afford to pay, and demanding lower bribes from firms that credibly can threaten to exit the market or use other means to acquire the service." Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Measuring and Understanding Corruption at the Micro Level , in Corrupt Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy of Corruption 135, 143 ( Donatella Della Porta & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 2002). Other factors, of course, constrain the bribe-seeking official. See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amount Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature , 48 Am. Bus. L.J. 77, 100–13 (2011) (describing factors considered by a public official contemplating a bribe, including criminal penalties, social costs, and psychic costs). 54 Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect , 87 J. Pub. Econ. 427, 428 (2003). 55 Kaufman & Wei, supra 45, at 5–6. 56 Id. at 10; see also id. at 12 ("[F]irms that report paying more bribes also spend more time negotiating with the bureaucracies … ."). 57 See id. at 9–10, 12. 58 See id. at 10. Kaufman and Wei separately analyzed companies operating in Asia because some people argue that the high growth experienced by many Asian countries indicates that corruption operates differently in Asia. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues , 35 J. Econ. Literature 1320, 1329–30 (1997). 59 See Kaufman & Wei, supra 45, at 12. 60 Alejandro Gaviria, Assessing the Effects of Corruption and Crime on Firm Performance: Evidence from Latin America , 3 Emerging Markets Rev. 245, 267 (2002). 61 See Jakob Svensson, The Cost of Doing Business: Firms' Experiences with Corruption , in Uganda's Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms, and Government 319, 319–20 ( Ritva Reinikka & Paul Collier eds., 2001). 62 Donato De Rosa et al., Corruption and Productivity Firm-Level Evidence from the BEEPS Survey 3–4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5348, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630232. 63 Id. at 34. 64 Id. at 5. 65 See id. at 34. 66 See id. at 5–6. 67 See Christopher Gulinello, Engineering a Venture Capital Market and the Effects of Government Control on Private Ordering: Lessons from the Taiwan Experience , 37 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 845, 845–47 (2005) (discussing these controls). 68 Kaufman & Wei, supra 45, at 11. 69 Francisco Ciocchini et al., Does Corruption Increase Emerging Market Bond Spreads? , 55 J. Econ. & Bus. 503, 512–13 (2003); Charles M.C. Lee & David Ng, Corruption and International Valuation: Does Virtue Pay? , 18 J. Investing 23, 31–33 (2005); see also Mark J. Garmaise & Jun Liu, Corruption, Firm Governance, and the Cost of Capital , Escholarship Univ. of Cal. 24–25 (Feb. 28, 2005), http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/1-05 (finding that corruption decreased firm value and thus increased the costs of raising capital). 70 Raymond Fisman & Jakob Svensson, Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm-Level Evidence , 83 J. Dev. Econ. 63, 63–64 (2007). 71 Id. at 67–69. 72 See id. at 65. 73 See id. at 66–67. 74 Svensson, supra 61, at 320. 75 Fisman & Svensson, supra 70, at 64. 76 See id. at 70. 77 Id. at 73. Fisman and Svensson conclude, "[T]he evidence we have presented and complementary, qualitative information from firm managers, points in one direction—corruption is a serious constraint on doing business." Id. 78 See Gaviria, supra 60, at 245. 79 Id. at 250. 80 See id. at 245. 81 Id. at 246. 82 Id. 83 D.W. Jorgenson & Z. Griliches, The Explanation of Productivity Change , 34 Rev. Econ. Stud. 249, 250 (1967). 84 See Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living Costs and Amenities , 116 Harv. L. Rev. 987, 997 42 (2003). 85 Johann Graf Lambsdorff, How Corruption Affects Productivity , 56 Kyklos: Int'l Rev. for Soc. Sci. 457, 457–69 (2003). 86 See id. at 457. 87 Id. at 468. 88 Id. at 468–69. 89 See Ernesto Dal Bó & Martín A. Rossi, Corruption and Inefficiency: Theory and Evidence from Electric Utilities , 91 J. Pub. Econ. 939, 939–60 (2007). 90 Id. at 940. 91 See id. at 958. 92 Id. 93 See Spahn, supra 44, at 888–89. Spahn suggests that, in extreme situations, "drive-by shootings are a possible exit strategy for unwanted partners." Id. at 889 (commenting specifically on experiences of Western business representatives in Russia). Her wry observation underscores the lack of transparent institutions to mediate the relationship between the bribe-paying firm and the bribe-accepting public official. 94 See William T. Ross & Diana C. Robertson, A Typology of Situational Factors: Impact on Salesperson Decision-Making About Ethical Issues , 46 J. Bus. Ethics 213, 228 (2003) (discussing their empirical study, which demonstrates that environmental and personal factors interact in complex ways to affect decisions about misconduct). 95 Mitchell J. Neubert et al., The Virtuous Influence of Ethical Leadership Behavior: Evidence from the Field , 90 J. Bus. Ethics 157, 157 (2009). Bart Victor and John Cullen define an ethical climate: "A work climate is defined as perceptions that 'are psychologically meaningful molar descriptions that people can agree characterize a system's practices and procedures.' The prevailing perceptions of typical organizational practices and procedures that have ethical content constitute the ethical work climate." Bart Victor & John B. Cullen, The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates , 33 Admin. Sci. Q. 101, 101 (1988) (quoting Benjamin Schneider, Organizational Climate: An Essay , 28 Personnel Psych. 447, 474 (1975)) (emphasis added). 96 Victor & Cullen, supra 95, at 104. 97 David J. Fritzsche, Ethical Climates and the Ethical Dimension of Decision Making , 24 J. Bus. Ethics 125, 125 (2000). 98 See, e.g., Anke Arnaud, Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethical Work Climate: Development and Validation of the Ethical Climate Index , 49 Bus. & Soc'y 345, 354–56 (2010) (proposing an Ethical Climate Index). 99 See Marshall Schminke et al., The Power of Ethical Work Climates , 36 Org. Dynamics 171, 175 (2007) (discussing empirical research on the powerful effects of workplace ethics climates). 100 Al Y.S. Chen et al., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making Through Corporate Culture , 16 J. Bus. Ethics 855, 861 (1997). 101 Scott J. Vitell et al., Ethical Problems, Conflicts and Beliefs of Small Business Professionals , 28 J. Bus. Ethics 15, 22 (2000). 102 William A. Weeks et al., The Role of Mere Exposure Effect on Ethical Tolerance: A Two-Study Approach , 58 J. Bus. Ethics 281, 282 (2005). 103 See Willa Bruce, Ethical People Are Productive People , 17 Pub. Productivity & Mgmt. Rev. 241, 248 (1994). 104 See Weeks et al., supra 102, at 289. 105 See J.A. Badenhorst, Unethical Behaviour in Procurement: A Perspective on Causes and Solutions , 13 J. Bus. Ethics 739, 743 (1994). 106 See Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure of Self-Restraint , 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 571, 572–73 (2007) (discussing enormous amount of money lost to kickbacks). 107 Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Beyond the Ethics Course: Making Conduct Count , 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 757, 757 (2008) (citing Cary Meiners, Employee Fraud: Detecting and Eliminating the Unintentional Perk , Risk Mgmt., April 2005, at 50, 51 (citing Ass'n of Certified Fraud Exam'rs, 2004 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (2004))). 108 Id.; see also Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: The Problems with Credit Checks in Employment and Strategies to Limit Their Use , 18 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 45, 49 24 (2010) (stating that employee theft costs U.S. retailers thirty billion dollars each year). 109 Roberto Concepcion, Jr., Pre-Employment Credit Checks: Effectuating Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities Under the Guise of Job-Relatedness and Business Necessity , 12 Scholar 523, 538 73 (2010) (citing William I. Sauser, Employee Theft: Who, How, Why, and What Can Be Done , S.A.M. Advanced Mgmt. J., Summer 2007, at 13). 110 Tang Zhihao, Businesses Lose Billions; Consumers End Up Paying , ChinaDaily (May 12, 2011, 10:24 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-05/12/content_12496247.htm. 111 Shoplifting Costing up to $800m a Year , NZ Herald (Oct. 20, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10681819. 112 Terence Daryl Shulman, Hard Times Lead to Increase in Stealing, Overshopping, and Overspending? , Annals Am. Psychotherapy Assoc., Spring 2009, at 32, 32. 113 See Badenhorst, supra 105, at 744; Bruce, supra 103, at 249; Vitell et al., supra 101, at 22. 114 Sahr John Kpundeh, Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone 109, 115 (1995). 115 Centre de Recherche et D'Etudes en Economie et Sondage, Enquete Nationale 2006 Aupres des Entreprises sur la Corruption au Cameroun 15 (2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/16826/226689/file/Comeroon_Rapport_final%20cretes_EntreprisesFINAL.pdf. 116 Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan , 22 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 863, 923 (2001). 117 World Bank Inst., Voices of the Misgoverned and Misruled: An Empirical Diagnostic Study on Governance, Rule of Law and Corruption for Peru , World Bank 8–10 (Sept. 10, 2001), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206576/peru_voicesreport.pdf. 118
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