Learning, Adapting, Applying
2007; Routledge; Volume: 152; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/03071840701863034
ISSN1744-0378
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements The author wishes to acknowledge the support and guidance provided in the development of this paper by Dr Daniel Marston, Dr John Mackinlay, Dr Conrad Crane, Brigadier (Rtd) Charles Grant, Colonel (Rtd) John Wilson and Miss Jaz Azeri. Notes 1. John Mackinlay, ‘Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan’, Whitehall Paper Number 64 (London: RUSI,, 2005); David Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency Redux,’ Survival (Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 2006).; Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007). 2. US Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1–1. Hereafter referred to as FM 3–24. 3. Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2005), p. 30. 4. FM 3-24, p. 1–1. The British Army defines insurgency as ‘actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.’ Army Code 71749 Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 Counter-Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines), London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, July 2001, p. A–3 5. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 63. 6. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 283. 7. Reported in Tony Allen-Mills, ‘Listen up maggot, we can win this,’ The Sunday Times, London, August 5, 2007. See also Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘A War We Just Might Win,’ New York Times, July 30, 2007, of particular interest given the authors ‘have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq.’ 8. For a supportive view, albeit from one involved in its production, see Frank Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?’ Parameters, Summer 2007, pp.71–87. For an evaluation of the doctrine from a tactical, operational and strategic perspective see James S Corum, ‘Rethinking US Army Counter-Insurgency Doctrine,’ Contemporary Security Policy (Vol. 28,, No.1, April 2007), pp. 127–142. For a highly critical view, see Ralph Peters, ‘Progress and Peril, New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam,’ Armed Forces Journal International, No. 144, February 2007. 9. Conrad Crane, The Production of FM 3–24, presentation at the Counterinsurgency and Peace Support Doctrine Conference, Institut Français des Relations Internationals, Paris: France, 5 June 2007. 10. Edward Luttwak, ‘Dead End,’ Harper's, February 2007 pp. 33–42. 11. John A. Nagl provides a succinct summary of how the doctrine was developed in ‘The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency’ in The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. xiii–xx. 12. Major General J F C Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1926), p. 254. 13. Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, interview by author, February 15, 2007. See Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, ‘Learning About Counterinsurgency,’ RUSI Journal, December 2006, pp. 16–21. 14. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Foreword by John A. Nagl, James F. Amos and David H. Petraeus., introduction by Sarah Sewall. 15. Colonel Alexander Alderson, ‘Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine,’ RUSI Journal (Vol. 152, No. 4, August 2007), pp. 6–11. 16. J.F.C. Fuller, Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson, 1923). 17. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping (London: Faber, 1971); Op cit., note 6. 18. Kitson, Ibid., p. 165. 19. Kitson, Ibid., p. 166. 20. Kitson, Ibid., p. 167. 21. Kitson, Ibid., p. 167. 22. FM 3–24, p. 1–26. 23. For an explanation of the development of AirLand Battle doctrine see Huba Wass de Czege, Making the Army's Doctrine ‘Right Enough’ Today, Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare Landpower Essay No. 06–2, September 2006. 24. Michael Howard, ‘Military Science in the Age of Peace’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 19, No. 2, March 1974), p. 7. 25. Crane, FM 3–24 The New American Approach to Counterinsurgency: Genesis and Content. 26. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, second edition (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, September 2005) and Metz, Rethinking Insurgency. 27. LTC Jan Horvath, FM 3-24 writing team, interview by author, Taji, Iraq, 12 June 2007. 28. Lieutenant General Sir Frank Kitson, Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture delivered May 1981, Upavon: Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Annex A to DCinC 8109 dated 11 Jun 81, p. 14. 29. Frederick W. Kagan, ‘Misunderstanding the Surge,’ The Weekly Standard, 5 June 2007; David Kilcullen, ‘Understanding Current Operations in Iraq’ posted 27 June 2007 at smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/ understanding-current-operatio/ 30. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 111–114. Assuming that the government has a plan, at the tactical level, Thompson describes an approach where intelligence-led operations act to clear insurgents from an area, control is imposed over the cleared area to protect the population and isolate the insurgent, good government in all its aspects introduced to win and the area is won at the point when control measures can be lifted. 31. David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956–1958, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1963, 2006 edition and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1966), reprinted 2006. 32. Frederick W. Kagan, ‘A Plan for Victory in Iraq: Defeat the Insurgents Militarily—Here's How,’ The Weekly Standard, 22 May 2006. For Kagan's account of the development of the American strategy in Iraq in 2006, based on Clear-Hold-Build, see www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/endgame/interviews/ kagan.html#3. 33. Iraq Planning Group, Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq Phase I Report, Washington DC: The American Enterprise Institute, 5 January 2007, p. 5. 34. General David H Petraeus, Commanding General Multi-National Force-Iraq, interview by author, 14 June 2007. 35. Author's note, Fort Leavenworth, February 24, 2006: ‘Recognition that context is important, particularly when reviewing doctrine and there is a natural tension between principles and the high emotion stemming from recent operational experience.’ John Nagl describes the conference in his preface to the University of Chicago Press edition of FM 3–24. 36. Conrad Crane, FM 3-24 The New American Approach to Counterinsurgency: Genesis and Content, presentation at the Exercise Unified Quest Defeating an Insurgency Seminar Wargame, McLean, VA, 20 February 2007. 37. Ralph Peters was particularly strong in his criticism of a draft of FM 3-24 because it failed to recognise religious zealots in its description of adversary groups. See ‘Politically Correct War,’ New York Times, 18 October 2006. 38. Interview with General David H Petraeus, Op cit.. 39. Interview with General David H Petraeus, Op cit.. The sceptic would ask whether there would have been any other response. The soldier and the student of counter-insurgency should be able to get beyond partisanship. 40. Senior British officer, telephone interview with author, Baghdad, 2 August 2007. 41. Dr A D Hossack, Research Paper II: Terrorist/Insurgent Success Factors, Farnborough: Defence Science & Technology Laboratory, September 2006. 42. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. xi. 43. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘A War We Just Might Win,’ New York Times, 30 July 2007. Additional informationNotes on contributorsAlexander AldersonColonel Alderson, who runs the Land Warfare Centre's Warfare Development Group, is leading the team which is currently updating the British Army's counter-insurgency doctrine.* He is an infantry officer, with operational experience in the Middle East, Northern Ireland and the Balkans. He is currently researching an MoD-sponsored PhD into the impact of Iraq on the British Army's approach to counter-insurgency. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's own, and do not reflect British Army or UK Ministry of Defence policy
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