Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs
2010; Wiley; Volume: 63; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00485.x
ISSN1467-6435
Autores Tópico(s)Gambling Behavior and Treatments
ResumoKyklosVolume 63, Issue 4 p. 517-529 Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs Antony W. Dnes, Antony W. Dnes University of Hull, EnglandSearch for more papers by this authorNuno Garoupa, Nuno Garoupa University of Illinois College of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue Champaign, 61820 IL * Antony W. Dnes, Leverhulme Fellow, University of Hull, England, [email protected]. Nuno Garoupa, University of Illinois College of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue Champaign, 61820 IL, [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Antony W. Dnes, Antony W. Dnes University of Hull, EnglandSearch for more papers by this authorNuno Garoupa, Nuno Garoupa University of Illinois College of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue Champaign, 61820 IL * Antony W. Dnes, Leverhulme Fellow, University of Hull, England, [email protected]. Nuno Garoupa, University of Illinois College of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue Champaign, 61820 IL, [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 15 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00485.xCitations: 12 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL SUMMARY Behavior in dysfunctional social groups is often regarded by social scientists as irrational in nature. We focus on many features of behavior within the street gang, also noting the existence of other gang-like groups, and show how apparently irrational behavior can signal the possession of valuable human capital. We contend that gangs are formed around particular traits of direct value to the group, and therefore of indirect value to the gang member, and construct a model with a separating equilibrium consistent with the existence of a large gap between the characteristics of gang members and the rest of society. Policy implications include a deduction that increasing the opportunities for gang members outside of life in the gang, perhaps through offering an amnesty, might reduce gangs but will unambiguously make remaining gangs even nastier. REFERENCES Abadinsky, H. (1987). The McDonald's-ization of the Mafia, in Organized Crime in America: Concepts and Controversies. edited by T. Bynum. New York: Criminal Justice Press: 125– 148. Alexander, B. (1997). The Rational Racketeer: Pasta Protection in Depression Era Chicago, Journal of Law and Economics. 40: 175– 202. Alexeev, M., E. Janeba and S. Osborne (2004). Taxation and Evasion in the Presence of Extortion by Organized Crime, Journal of Comparative Economics. 32: 375– 387. Allen, D.W. and C.G. Reed (2006). The Duel of Honor: Screening for Unobservable Social Capital, American Law and Economics Review. 8 (1): 81– 115. Backhaus, J. (1979). Defending Organized Crime? A Note, Journal of Legal Studies. 8: 623– 631. Bai, K.H. and I.G. Kim (2001). Optimal Punishment when Individuals may Learn Deviant Values, International Review of Law and Economics. 21: 271– 285. Bandiera, O. (2003). Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 19: 218– 244. Billacois, F. (1990). The Duel: Its Rise and Fall in Early Modern France. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Buchanan, J.M. (1973). A Defense of Organized Crime? in The Economics of Crime and Punishment. edited by S. Rottenberg, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute: 119– 132. Cameron, S. (1988). The Economics of Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, Kyklos. 41: 301– 323. Calvo-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2004). Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior, International Economic Review. 45: 939– 958. Chang, J.J., H.C. Lu and M. Chen (2005). Organized Crime or Individual Crime? Endogenous Size of a Criminal Organization and the Optimal Law Enforcement, Economic Inquiry. 43: 661– 675. Deschenes, E.P. and F. Esbensen (1997). Saints, Delinquents, and Gang Members: Differences in Attitudes and Behavior, in The Modern Gang Reader. edited by M.W. Klein, C.L. Maxson and J. Miller. Los Angeles: Roxbury: 63– 78. Dick, A.R. (1995). When does Organized Crime Pay? A Transactions Cost Analysis, International Review of Law and Economics. 15: 25– 45. Donohue, J. and J. Wolfers (2009). Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder, American Law and Economics Review. 11: 249– 309. Foreman-Peck, J. and S.C. Moore (2010). Gratuitous Violence and the Rational Offender Model, International Review of Law and Economics. 30: 160– 172. Frey, B.S., S. Luechinger and A. Stutzer (2007). Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism, Journal of Economic Surveys. 21: 1– 24. Frey, B.S. and S. Luechinger (2003). How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence, Defence and Peace Economics. 14: 237– 249. Gambetta, D. (1994). Inscrutable Markets, Rationality and Society. 6: 334– 352. Garoupa, N. (2000). The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement, Economic Inquiry. 38: 278– 288. Garoupa, N. (2006). Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 63: 461– 474. Gilbert, F. (2006). Yob Nation: The Truth About Britain's Yob Culture. London: Portrait. Jennings, W.P. (1984). A Note on the Economics of Organized Crime, Eastern Economic Journal. 3: 315– 321. Klein, M.W. (1995). The American Street Gang. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Konrad, K.A. and S. Skaperdas (1997). Credible Threats in Extortion, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 33: 23– 39. Konrad, K.A. and S. Skaperdas (1998). Extortion, Economica. 65: 461– 477. Kugler, M., T. Verdier and Y. Zenou (2005). Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment, Journal of Public Economics. 89: 1639– 1663. Leeson, P. (2007). Trading with Bandits, Journal of Law and Economics. 50: 303– 322. Leeson, P. (2009). The Invisible Hook. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Levitt, S. and A. Venkatesh (2000a). An Economic Analysis of a Drug-selling Gang's Finances, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115 (3): 755– 789. Levitt, S. and A. Venkatesh (2000b). Are We a Family or a Business? History and Disjuncture in the Urban American Street Gang, Theory & Society. 29: 427. Mansour, A., N. Marceau and S. Mongrain (2006). Gangs and Crime Deterrence, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 22: 315– 339. Milhaupt, C.J. and M.D. West (2000). The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, University of Chicago Law Review. 67: 41– 98. Milhaupt, C.J. and M.D. West (2004). Economic Organization and Corporate Governance in Japan: The Impact of Formal and Informal Rules. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moselle, B. and B. Polak (2001). A Model of a Predatory State, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 17: 1– 33. Opp, K-D. (1989). Economics of Crime and the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour A Theoretical Confrontation of Basic Propositions, Kyklos. 42: 405– 430. Priks, M. (2010). Does Frustration Lead to Violence? Evidence from the Swedish Hooligan Scene, Kyklos, forthcoming. Reuter, P. (1983). Disorganized Crime. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Seals, A. (2009). Are Gangs Substitutes for Legitimate Employment? Investigating the Impact of Labor Market Effects on Gang Affiliation, Kyklos. 62: 407– 425. Schelling, T.C. (1980). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. Skaperdas, S. (2001). The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection when the State does not, Economics of Governance. 2: 173– 202. Skaperdas, S. and C. Syropoulos (1995). Gangs as Primitive States, in The Economics of Organised Crime. edited by G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and CEPR: 61– 82. Sobel, R. and B. Osoba (2006). Youth Gangs as Pseudo-governments: Implications for Violent Crime. SSRN Working Paper. Thrasher, F.M. (1968). The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago. 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Turvani, M. (1997). Illegal Markets and the New Institutional Economics, in Transaction Cost Economics. edited by C. Menard. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1– 29. Venkatesh, P. (2008). Gang Leader for a Day. New York and London: Penguin. Walsh, P. (2003). Gang War: The Inside Story of the Manchester Gangs. Chatham: Milo Books Ltd. White, D. (2004). Taba and the Rude Girls: Cultural Constructions of the Youth Street Gang, Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media. 1 (2): 41– 50. Citing Literature Volume63, Issue4November 2010Pages 517-529 ReferencesRelatedInformation
Referência(s)