Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy
2012; The MIT Press; Volume: 92; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture
ResumoIN A RECENT interview, Dr. John Nagl was asked what he would change in the rewrite of the Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency. He responded-The biggest question that we have to come to terms with as we rewrite the FM is whether its foundation on the promotion of host nation government legitimacy should be preserved. The manual was written at a particular point in time when democracy promotion was a key tenet of American foreign policy. And the two most important counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns that we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan were campaigns in which newly created democratic governments were struggling. I am unconvinced that that is the right model, that the only way to achieve legitimacy is through democracy promotion early on in a counterinsurgency campaign. I think that this is the most fundamental question we have to come to terms with.1Nagl's comments highlight three points. First, political legitimacy is still a key problem in COIN operations and something we did not get right the first time around. Second, the manual was written in the shadow of a specific political policy; spreading liberal democracy must be part of the goal of COIN and stability operations. Third, pushing for democracy too early may not always be feasible or even advisable.Recent policy statements may have opened the door to review how we prioritize COIN operations in the future. This article will look at what the old policy was and how it affected doctrine, then look at a recent shiftin policy and try to divine what ramifications this shiftshould have on COIN and stability operations with regard to how the military looks at political legitimacy. I will discuss a more expansive approach to political legitimacy than our doctrine currently embraces and make some suggestions on how future doctrine should look at legitimacyPrior U.S. PolicyPrevious administrations have made spreading democracy and liberal ideals a foreign policy objective. Democracy promotion has been part of U.S. policy since the end of World War II, but, with the end to the cold war, the policy did not require extensive Defense Department participation. The George W. Bush administration made the idea a central component of its anti-terrorism campaign and its defense policy, particularly in the Middle East.2 The policy relies on the idea that terrorists are not able to thrive where democratic values and freedoms exist.The method chosen to spread democracy was a variation of democratization theory based on the idea that if one creates democratic institutions, the population's values will change to embrace these institutions. 3 If one creates democratic systems, including legislatures and executives filled by elected representatives, the population will embrace democracy. In addition to the government structure, one must build an open, educated, and economically strong civil society.4 This would require schools and other socioeconomic systems that support democracy. This was the Field of Dreams philosophy: if you build it, they will come. In locations like Afghanistan, this means a massive nationbuilding effort along with a strong security presence.The policy required that when we decided it was in our national security interests to intervene in a situation where there was either a failed state or we had effected regime change, it did not matter what form of government the local population saw as legitimate. When we departed, the only form of government that would be acceptable was one that supported democratic institutions, and not just any democratic institution, but one that promoted individual freedom and had a liberal form of political legitimacy.Current Doctrine and LegitimacyAccording to FM 3-24, legitimacy is the main objective in a political insurgency.5 Whichever side the population regards as legitimate, government or insurgent, has a distinct advantage in the conflict. Yet FM 3-24 spends less than a paragraph on a discussion of types of legitimacy and no time at all on which type the population accepts. …
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