Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (review)
2011; Middle East Institute; Volume: 65; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
1940-3461
Autores Tópico(s)Economic Sanctions and International Relations
ResumoIRAQ Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, by Dennis P. Chapman. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2011. $45. Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter Although a great deal has been written recently about the Iraqi Kurds and their largely autonomous federal state within Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), we know comparatively little about the military and security forces that have so often been the primary instruments of their struggle (p. 4). Dennis P. Chapman, a Lieutenant Colonel the US armed forces, has given us a detailed technical study that helps close these gaps our understanding. He published an earlier version of his present work with the US Army War College 2009. Specifically, Chapman analyzes the organization, administration, command structure, and legal basis, among others, of the KRG's security sector including its military forces (Peshmerga), police, security agencies (Asayish [Security]), intelligence services (Parastin [Protection] and Dezgay Zenyari [Information Apparatus]), paramilitary security services (Zerivani), as well as the judiciary and penal systems. addition, Chapman discusses the degree of unity these institutions achieved by the KRG's two ruling parties, Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). As recently as 1994-1998, these two parties fought each other a bitter civil war, and animosities still exist. The author also examines the relationship between the and the Government of Iraq (GOI) both within and outside the KRG's yet-tobe- determined final boundaries. Chapman writes, By its own admission, as of [the] fall of 2008 the PUK had approximately 7,000 Peshmerga deployed outside its own administrative area (p. 229). Chapman's main concern is with the Peshmerga, or KRG's regular military forces. In the years since the 1991 Gulf War, the Peshmerga have undergone a systematic reorganization, evolving from a force of relatively loosely organized party-based militia [or guerrillas] into [a] large, legally constituted regional force organized along the lines of a regular army (p. 97). The author provides a great deal of technical information - complete with detailed charts that will surfeit even the most demanding analyst. Although he finds that the Peshmerga has been generally eschewing the terrorism and other forms of misconduct that so other insurgent groups have taken to with zeal (p. 104), many Peshmerga veterans still serving are not really qualified for service a modern force for a number of reasons, including age, literacy, and inability to adapt to new conditions (p. 127). Chapman also provides useful details on the Turkish army's presence the region (1200-1500 troops [p. 135]), funding debates between the and GOI regarding Peshmerga salaries and pensions, operations outside the particularly in areas with large concentrations of Kurdish population, indicating an implied task of securing Kurdish communities not under the formal jurisdiction of the KRG (p. …
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