Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare
2008; The MIT Press; Volume: 88; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoIT IS EVIDENT, remarked secretary of War Elihu Root at end of Philippine War, insurrection has been brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on one hand and by making peace attractive.1 Root's appraisal holds true for much of U.S. Army's experience waging irregular wars. Nevertheless, there remains much confusion over roles that persuasion and coercion play rebellions and other internal conflicts. Having recently concluded second a two-volume study on U.S. Army's experience waging counterinsurgency warfare, I'd like to explore relationship between force and politics by examining three conflicts that United States Army was involved during 19th and 20th centuries: War of Rebellion (the U.S. Civil War, 1861-1865), Philippine War (1899-1902), and Vietnam War (1954-1975). The War of Rebellion President Abraham Lincoln understood importance of political factors when he set out to defeat Southern rebellion against U.S. government. During early stages of conflict, he charted a moderate course, both to pave way for reconciliation and to mollify opinion Border States. He avoided attacking South's peculiar institution (slavery), offered amnesty, commuted sentences, released civilian prisoners, and tried to restore normal civil life to occupied areas as soon as possible. Most of his commanders embraced these policies, and when they did not, he rebuked or removed them. Lincoln's moderation failed to persuade Southerners to lay down their arms, however, and over time president accepted sterner measures to control and, if necessary, to punish rebellious civilians. He suspended habeas corpus and imposed loyalty oaths, while his commanders relocated levied fines, and confiscated property. Major General William T. Sherman epitomized this less tolerant approach. Believing that government was only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, Sherman decided that it must make old and young, rich and poor, feel hard hand of war.2 He therefore directed that in districts and neighborhoods where army is unmolested, no destruction of property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bush whackers molest our march, or should inhabitants . . . otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to measure of hostility.3 Devastation, not indiscriminate but directed at disloyal, was meant to weaken rebels' ability to fight as well as their will to do so. The growing use of collective punitive measures did not mean that Lincoln had abandoned moderation. In 1863, for example, he unveiled a generous process through which rebellious states could rejoin Union. He likewise signed General Orders 100, Instructions for Government of Armies of United States Field, which reminded Soldiers that the ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace, and that men who take up arms against one another public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.4 The document admonished Soldiers to respect personal and property rights of civilians as well as their social customs and religious beliefs. It likewise forbade wanton destruction, looting, cruelty, and torture. Nevertheless, benevolence was not a one-way street, and should citizenry spurn hand of reconciliation, General Orders 100 permitted commanders to take stern measures. Among punishments it prescribed for civilians who aided enemy were fines, expulsion, relocation, imprisonment, and death. The orders also authorized commanders to use calculated and proportional retaliation; to deny quarter for those who gave none; and to dispense summary punishments to guerrillas, spies, and traitors. Throughout remainder of rebellion, Lincoln continued to wield inducements one hand and punishments other. …
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