Confucian Filial Piety, Economic Growth and Divergence among Civilizations
2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/02529203.2012.731802
ISSN1940-5952
Autores Tópico(s)Economic Growth and Productivity
ResumoAbstract 应用经济学方法研究儒家孝道思想对古代社会经济增长的影响机制, 可以发现, 在信贷市场极不完备的古代, 孝道作为一个独特的代际契约履约机制, 能在一定程度 上克服代际契约中的证实和承诺问题, 从而以一种增加储蓄的方式有效促进古代社会 的经济增长。然而, 实施和维持孝道却不完全是自发的, 需要来自统治者的干预。而 对于统治者来说, 他需要将资源在配置给生产和配置给战争之间权衡。这一权衡决定 了一个社会均衡的孝道水平。通过比较中原文明、匈奴游牧文明和罗马文明的历史, 证明了上述观点, 从而在一定程度上解释了东西方文明的差异。 This paper employs an economic approach to analyze the influence of Confucian filial piety on economic growth in ancient China. In the highly imperfect credit market of the time, filial piety, as a unique mechanism for fulfilling intergenerational contracts, could to some extent solve problems of verifiability and commitment and thus effectively promote economic growth by increasing savings. However, the implementation and maintenance of filial piety were not spontaneous; it required external intervention by the rulers. Rulers faced a tradeoff when allocating resources between production and war. It was this tradeoff that determined the level of filial piety in society. A comparison between the civilizations of the Central Plains, nomadic Xiongnu society and ancient Rome verifies our proposition and thus explains in some degree the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations. 关键词: 儒家孝道代际交换经济增长文明分岔Keywords: Confucian filial pietyintergenerational exchangeeconomic growthdivergence among civilizations Notes 1 Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. 2 Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. 3 Max Weber, Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. 4 Leften Stavros Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century. 5 Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness. 6 Robert Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," pp. 65-94. 7 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. 8 Frank Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving," pp. 543-559; David Cass, "Optimum Growth in an Aggregate Model of Capital Accumulation," pp. 233-240; Tjalling C. Koopmans, "On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth." 9 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. 10 Heng-fu Zou, "The Spirit of Capitalism and Long-run Growth," pp. 279-293; Gurdip Bakshi and Zhiwu Chen, "The Spirit of Capitalism and Stock Market Prices," pp. 133-157; Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite, "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," pp. 1092-1125; Robert J. Barro and Rachel McCleary, "Religion and Economic Growth across Countries," pp. 760-781. 11 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. 12 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies; Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past. 13 Antonio Rangel, "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?," pp. 813-834. 14 Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, "Norms, Third-party Sanctions, and Cooperation," pp. 33-57. 15 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, "Economics and Identity," pp. 715-753. 16 Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," pp. 691-719. 17 Zhou Nan, On Jus Romanum, vol. 1, p. 151. 18 Under steady state conditions the result of the game over the two periods may last forever. 19 This is based on such a fact that in both the East and the West the elderly hold the position of head of the family; the difference between them lies in the degree to which the patriarchal power is actually realized, a difference reflected in their different levels of filial piety. 20 That the optimum tax rate is 1 seems to be contrary to intuition, but this is the natural result of the two-period model. Under multiple-period and even infinite-period dynamic conditions, this will not happen, because more tax will lead to lower output in the subsequent period. Theoretically, as long as the Laffer curve works, the optimal tax rate should, strictly speaking, be less than 1. As our discussions do not focus on the optimum tax rate, it does not affect the main conclusions of this paper. 21 Mencius, "Duke Wen of Teng, Part II." 22 Huang Liuzhu, "The Han Dynasty System of Recommending People Noted for Their Moral Record for Official Positions." 23 Yu Congrong and Zhang Yunhua, "Approaches to the Promotion of Filial Piety in the Han Dynasty and Their Implications." 24 Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Prosperity and Crisis: On the Super-stable Structure of Chinese Feudal Society. 25 In the period from the beginning of the Han Dynasty (202 BC) to the second year of the Yuanshi reign period (2 AC) in the late Western Han, the Chinese population increased from 15-18 million to 60 million, i.e. it more than tripled. Cf. Ge Jianxiong, ed., A History of Chinese Population, p. 375. 26 Li Yining, An Economic History of Rome-Byzantine, vol. 1, p. 47. 27 Zhou Nan, On Jus Romanum, vol. 1, pp. 148-150. 28 Li Yining, An Economic History of Rome-Byzantine, vol. 1, p. 32. 29 Zhou Nan, On Jus Romanum, vol. 1, pp. 151-159.
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