A Concrete Security Analysis for 3GPP-MAC
2003; Springer Science+Business Media; Linguagem: Inglês
10.1007/978-3-540-39887-5_12
ISSN1611-3349
AutoresDowon Hong, Ju-Sung Kang, Bart Preneel, Heuisu Ryu,
Tópico(s)Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
ResumoThe standardized integrity algorithm f9 of the 3GPP algorithm computes a MAC (Message Authentication Code) to establish the integrity and the data origin of the signalling data over a radio access link of W-CDMA IMT-2000. The function f9 is based on the block cipher KASUMI and it can be considered as a variant of CBC-MAC. In this paper we examine the provable security of f9. We prove that f9 is a secure pseudorandom function by giving a concrete bound on an adversary's inability to forge a MAC value in terms of her inability to distinguish the underlying block cipher from a random permutation.
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