The Militia System and the State Militias in the War of 1812
1977; Indiana University Press; Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
1942-9711
Autores Tópico(s)American Constitutional Law and Politics
Resumodebates concerning the constitutional responsi bility for the militia did not cause the militia's deterioration. Had the people given the militia system greater support, their elected representatives at both the national and the state levels would have been less disposed to advance litigious argu ments justifying evasions of responsibility for the mainten ance of the militia. debates and the excuses were merely symptomatic of the country's prevalent spirit, a spirit which combined egalitarian individualism and economic opportunism with aversion to military service. Even during the Revolu tion, it had been apparent that many Americans not only disliked standing armies, but resisted soldiering in any guise. Once the Revolution ended and men became busy with civilian affairs, that attitude only intensified.74 Addressing Virginia's constitutional ratification conven tion, Francis Corbin had warned that if our defense be 71 Brig. Gen. Peter . Porter, To the Public, December 14, 1812, in Brannan, Official Letters, 106; and note 61, above. A cursory exam ination of battle reports turned up seventeen additional instances in which substantial militia units arrived at rendezvous or on the battle field without weapons. 72 Governor William James to Monroe, September 1814, American State Papers, Military Affairs, I, 622. 73 Executive Secretary . B. Boileau to Armstrong, August 27, 1814, Ingraham, Sketch of the Events, 45-46. 74 See Bernardo and Bacon, American Military Policy, 6-10, 19-22, 25-31, 77-82, 93-108. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.13 on Thu, 25 Aug 2016 05:54:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 120 Indiana Magazine of History solely trusted to militia, ignorance of arms, and negligence of farming, will ensue . . . .75 In practice Americans slighted the arts of war in order to concentrate upon the rewards of peace. As Alexander Hamilton had predicted, the indus trious habits of the people . . . absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, proved to be incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers . . . ,76 Reporting to a House committee after the War of 1812, Harrison noted that the sentiments and habits of a free country necessarily produce amongst the citizens a superior restlessness under restraint than is to be met with in the subjects of a monarchy. This spirit fre quently manifests itself even in a career of military serv ice ... . There can scarcely be a restraint more vexatious and disgusting to a grown man, than the initiatory lessons of the military art. ... It is believed that to this cause is to be attributed the little progress which has been made in training the militia of thee [sic] United States.77 militia system established in 1792 did not fail in 1812 because the system envisioned by the Militia Act was not really tried during the war. system was designed to provide a well regulated militia, organized, trained, sup plied, and ready for service in the field. Generally speaking, the crowds of militiamen who reported to rendezvous came to war unorganized, poorly drilled, ill equipped, and unpre pared. Once committed to combat, these crowds were often deployed as if they were experienced line infantry?exposed on open ground and expected to maneuver and fire with the steady precision of synthetic regulars.78 It would be difficult to imagine any tactic less suited to the talents of raw en listees. War, as Fortescue remarked, is an ugly thing at 75 Francis Corbin to the Virginia Constitutional Ratification Conven tion, June 1788, Elliot, Debates, III, 112-13. 76 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 8, in Earle, Federalist, 44. 77 Report of the Select Committee on Militia Reorganization, House of Representatives, January 17, 1817, American State Papers, Military Affairs, I, 664. 78 [Gleig], A Subaltern in America, 67, 72; Rear Adm. George Cockburn to Vice Adm. John B. Warren, April 20, 1813, James, Military Occurrences, II, 405; Col. Edward Baynes to Pr?vost, May 30, 1813, ibid., I, 415; Maj. Gen. Robert Ross to Bathurst, August 30, 1814, ibid., II, 497 ; Brown to Armstrong, June 1, 1813, Palmer, Historical Register, II, 231 ; Report of the Court of Inquiry in the Case of Brigadier General Winder, February 25, 1815, Ingraham, Sketch of the Events, 64. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.13 on Thu, 25 Aug 2016 05:54:37 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
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