Does Aristotle Have a Consistent Account of Vice
2003; Philosophy Education Society Inc.; Volume: 57; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
2154-1302
Autores Tópico(s)Free Will and Agency
ResumoHOW ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VICE (1) Aristotle's ethics? (2) As many commentators have noted, it is by no means obvious that Aristotle's scattered remarks about vice really add up to a coherent account. In several places Aristotle clearly assigns the leading role the explanation of vicious action to reason. We see this, for example, the unequivocal claim that acts expressing intemperance are in accordance with ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (3) This is important, part because it provides a basis for the distinction between vice and akrasia. Although both the intemperate and the akratic do what they ought not, the intemperate pursue their goal guided by reason and with little or no ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), (4) whereas the akratic act from appetite. (5) What both pursue and what both ought not pursue--is bodily pleasure. (6) The difference is that the vicious pursue bodily pleasure because they think it is the central component the good life. (7) Thus, they choose pleasure as a good, indeed as the most important good. The akratic, on the other hand, pursue bodily pleasure as such and do so contrary to their conception of the good. When Aristotle writes about vice as a disposition to choose what promotes a certain conception of the good, and especially when he is distinguishing between intemperance and weakness, one cannot but be struck by the similarity between virtue and vice. Both are fixed conditions of the soul that concern the choice of what promotes what appears to be good. The virtuous and vicious alike pursue their respective goals without appetite, and both enjoy a harmony between what they find pleasant and what they take to be good. The only difference, it seems, is that the virtuous choose that which promotes what is actually good and the vicious select what falsely appears good. Elsewhere, however, Aristotle seems to have a different, distinctly Platonic, conception of vice mind. (8) In 3.12, for example, he clearly indicates that the appetites of the intemperate do not always fall behind reason's lead. There he describes the appetites of the vicious as great and strong ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) (9) and disobedient to the ruling principle ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (10) Later, 9.4, Aristotle draws a picture of the vicious soul that could not be more different from the psychically stable and harmonious virtuous soul. For [bad people, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]] are conflict ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) with themselves, and while they desire ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) some things, they wish ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) for other things, like the akratic ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]); for they select instead of what they believe to be good for them, things that are pleasant yet harmful ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]); they also pull back because of cowardice or laziness from doing what they think is best for them ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (11) A few lines later Aristotle's description of the vicious soul stands stark contrast to what is said book 7 about how that the elements of the intemperate soul are united the pursuit of a common goal. [The vicious] do not rejoice and grieve with themselves. Their soul is conflict ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). On the one hand, it is pained on account of vice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]) when it is kept from some things, and on the other, it is pleased, and the one part drags it here and the other there, just as if it is being pulled apart ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (12) At 9.4.1166b7-8 it is clear that the conflict Aristotle is thinking about is between wish ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]), a desire generated by reason itself and appetite ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII. …
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