Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?
2004; The MIT Press; Volume: 84; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoIN THE GLOBAL War on Terrorism (GWOT), while Operation Enduring Freedom aims to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) continues with little fanfare. The operation began in response to the kidnappings of U.S. citizens by the Abu Sayyef Group (ASG), a radical Muslim organization backed by al-Qaeda. From the U.S. perspective, the GWOT is a counterinsurgency operation on a global scale-a fight pitting those who believe in democracy and freedom against those who seek to enslave the world in an Islamic dictatorship. To successfully counter this threat, the United States and its allies must- * Deny sanctuary to terrorists and insurgents. * Eliminate their ability to move throughout their desired operational area (in this case, the world). * Deny them direct or indirect support from sympathizers and nation-states. * Wage psychological and civil affairs campaigns to separate the insurgency from the population using all the elements of national power: diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. The United States is executing this strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it is not being effective in Asia. Before 11 September 2001, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) was already interested in events in the Philippines. In August 2001, ASG kidnapped a U.S. citizen, Jeffrey Schilling. The U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) deployed a Department of State-funded mobile training team to provide the Philippine government with a national counterterrorist capability. A U.S. Special Forces (SF) unit trained and equipped a Philippine light reaction company (LRC) drawn from the ranks of the Philippine army's special forces and scout ranger organizations. From February to july 2001, while the LRC was being trained, the ASG kidnapped three more U.S. citizens. One key issue the LRC training identified was that, while the Philippines government could develop a tactically proficient counterterrorism force, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) did not have a command and control structure to properly employ the LRC or to integrate it with other forces and current operations. Two days after completing training, the LRC deployed to the island of Basilan in the southern Philippine province of Mindanao in response to the ASG hostage crisis. However, the LRC deployed as a conventional unit, not as a national-level counterter-rorist force. Before the LRC deployed, American SF advisers had requested that they accompany the unit, but SOCPAC approved only a follow-on assessment mission and took no action until the tragedy of 11 September 2001. In October 2001, the assessment mission developed a plan for the PACOM commander that called for the deployment of about 160 American SF advisers to Basilan to train, advise, and assist AFP units. In February 2002, under the guise of an exercise named Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder), the operation began. Elements of it continue to this day. Mission and Intent The mission on Basilan was to conduct unconventional warfare operations in the Southern Philippines through, by, and with the AFP to help the Philippine government separate the population from and to destroy terrorist organizations. The plan's intent was to provide all SF elements on Basilan with unifying guidance that would help harmonize counterterrorist and counted nsurgency operations in the Southern Philippines with initial focus on Basilan. The key tasks Special Forces were to perform included- * Denying the ASG sanctuary. * Surveilling, controlling, and denying ASG routes. * Surveilling supporting villages and key personnel. * Conducting local training to overcome AFP weaknesses and sustain AFP strengths. * Supporting operations by the AFP strike force (LRC) in the area of responsibility (AOR). * Conducting and supporting civil affairs operations in the AOR. …
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