Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
2013; Econometric Society; Volume: 8; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.3982/te944
ISSN1933-6837
Autores Tópico(s)Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
ResumoTheoretical EconomicsVolume 8, Issue 1 p. 95-123 Open Access Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case Péter Vida, Péter Vida Department of Economics, University of Mannheim; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorFrançoise Forges, Françoise Forges Université Paris-Dauphine and Institut Universitaire de France; [email protected] Péter Vida proved the main result of this paper as part of his doctoral thesis at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. A preliminary version of the paper, by Péter Vida, circulated under the title "From Communication Equilibria to Correlated Equilibria." The two authors had discussions on this research in 2005–2006 and completed the present version in 2010–2011. Péter Vida's work on the paper was completed while he was employed by the University of Vienna. We wish to thank Elchanan Ben-Porath, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Olivier Gossner, Manfred Nermuth, Eilon Solan, Adam Szeidl, and the participants of the workshop "Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing and Cryptography" held at Princeton in June 2010. Finally, three referees and, especially, a co-editor of Theoretical Economics raised interesting questions that led us to establish additional results.Search for more papers by this author Péter Vida, Péter Vida Department of Economics, University of Mannheim; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorFrançoise Forges, Françoise Forges Université Paris-Dauphine and Institut Universitaire de France; [email protected] Péter Vida proved the main result of this paper as part of his doctoral thesis at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. A preliminary version of the paper, by Péter Vida, circulated under the title "From Communication Equilibria to Correlated Equilibria." The two authors had discussions on this research in 2005–2006 and completed the present version in 2010–2011. Péter Vida's work on the paper was completed while he was employed by the University of Vienna. We wish to thank Elchanan Ben-Porath, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Olivier Gossner, Manfred Nermuth, Eilon Solan, Adam Szeidl, and the participants of the workshop "Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing and Cryptography" held at Princeton in June 2010. Finally, three referees and, especially, a co-editor of Theoretical Economics raised interesting questions that led us to establish additional results.Search for more papers by this author First published: 22 January 2013 https://doi.org/10.3982/TE944Citations: 9 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk. References Abraham, Ittai, Danny Dolev, and Joseph Y. Halpern (2008), " Lower bounds on implementing robust and resilient mediators." In Proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Theory of Cryptography, 302– 319, Springer, Heidelberg . DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8\_17 Aumann, Robert J. (1974), "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67– 96. DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 Aumann, Robert J. (1987), "Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica, 55, 1– 18. 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Unpublished paper, University of Vienna and Cardiff University . Citing Literature Volume8, Issue1January 2013Pages 95-123 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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