Perry on Reference and Reflexive Contents
2010; Wiley; Volume: 4; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1749-818x.2010.00191.x
ISSN1749-818X
Autores Tópico(s)Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
ResumoLanguage and Linguistics CompassVolume 4, Issue 4 p. 219-231 Perry on Reference and Reflexive Contents Gregory Bochner, Gregory Bochner Université Libre de Bruxelles & Institut Jean NicodSearch for more papers by this author Gregory Bochner, Gregory Bochner Université Libre de Bruxelles & Institut Jean NicodSearch for more papers by this author First published: 31 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-818X.2010.00191.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract John Perry has devoted most of his recent work to the development of what he calls a reflexive–referential theory of utterance content. The theory has two main motivations. The primary purpose of the theory was to offer a new solution in the old controversy between referentialists and descriptivists. The second application of the theory, emphasized in the recent collaboration with Kepa Korta, is to yield a satisfactory compromise in the contemporary debate between minimalists and contextualists. The key idea is that, by acknowledging that any utterance conveys not a single content but a plurality of contents, we can do justice to the intuitions and arguments put forward by all descriptivists, referentialists, minimalists and contextualists at once. The theory recognizes two different kinds of contents, referential and reflexive. The referential content of an utterance u containing a proper name or an indexical expression involves an individual, as the referentialist urges; and, as the contextualist claims, usually that referential content plays the role of what is said by u. In addition to this referential content, u also conveys a variety of other contents: reflexive contents. Each of these corresponds to a different content about u itself, given different facts about u. Perry treats the various reflexive contents of u as descriptive contents, and argues, on behalf of the descriptivist, that some of these capture the cognitive value of utterances like u containing referential terms. Finally, and to pacify the minimalist, one of the reflexive contents of u corresponds to a minimal content, determined independently of context, in virtue of linguistic conventions alone. 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