The crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran: 1019
1999; Middle East Institute; Volume: 53; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
1940-3461
Autores Tópico(s)American Constitutional Law and Politics
ResumoThe Iranian Revolution was founded on a dual legitimacy, religious and political, which was embodied by Imam Ruhollah Khomeini. But Constitution, rulings of Khomeini, and political process since his demise show that political aspect has come to dominate and define role of religion. This politicization, accompanied by an Iranization of supranational Shi'ism, leads to a de facto secularization, and actually undermines traditional basis of strength and independence of Shi'i clergy. The election of Iranian President Muhammad Khatami in May 1997 was an expression not only of a popular call for a more open and democratic society, but also of increasing crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was, from its inception, explicitly based on conjunction of two legitimacies, religious and political, through concept of Velayat-e Faqih, the Mandate of Jurist, meaning that highest authority of Islamic Revolution, Guide or Leader (Rahbar), should be both one of highest religious authorities (marja or source of imitation, plural maradi `) and political leader, who understands his (agah be zaman) and therefore could lead a mass movement. But this congruence was realized only in late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini's person. The Constitution stressed that Khomeini was both highest ranking and political leader par excellence: thus, ideal type of Guide is a faqih (jurist) who embodies both legitimacies, before his appointment. And, in any case, after his appointment, he should be considered as both a learned cleric and a political leader. But Khomeini's death in 1989 meant end of this double legitimacy. His successor as Guide, Ayatollah `Ali Khamene'i, was not a leading religious authority. This led to two questions: should Guide be primarily a leading religious authority, or a political one? Second, how could an Islamic revolution bypass, through a political appointment, highest religious authorities of time, and even turn its back on some shari'a (Islamic law) requirements? Nevertheless, this conceptual crisis did not turn into a political one as long as all elections (presidential and parliamentary) selected candidates from a relatively homogeneous ruling elite from time of Khomeini's death in 1989 until 1997. But, in May 1997, President Khatami was elected against avowed wishes of Guide, Khamene'i, bringing two legitimacies into contradiction, even though, of course, new president officially recognized supremacy of Guide. If Guide, who already lacked some religious credentials, is now losing his political support, on which legitimacy is his leadership still based? What we are witnessing since Khatami's election is unfolding of a contradiction which already existed in text of Constitution: in a religious revolution, such as Iranian Islamic Revolution, status and role of religion is nevertheless defined by political institutions, not religious ones. Politics rule over religion. The crisis of religious legitimacy is leading to supremacy of politics, and subsequently to a de facto secularization. There is a growing tendency, not only among democrats and but also traditional clerics, to separate religion and politics, this time in order to save Islam from politics, and not, as was case in most of processes of secularization in Western Europe, to save politics from religion. We can distinguish four levels of crisis: conceptual, clerical, political, and religious, leading to a complex array of positions from different actors. As we shall see, it is a bit difficult in Iran to oppose radicals and moderates, conservatives and liberals, traditionalists and modernists, not to speak of leftists and rightists. If Khatami might qualify as a liberal, a moderate and a modernist, many of his supporters came from radical side (and specifically from American Embassy hostage-takers, such as Muhammad Musavi Kho'einiha and `Ali Akbar Mohtashemi), or from statist-leftist side, like Mir-Hosein Musavi or Ayatollah Hassan Sana'i, whose foundation is promoting fatwa calling for death of British writer Salman Rushdie. …
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