Vietnam: General Vo Nguyen Giap

2005; The MIT Press; Volume: 85; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

ISSN

0026-4148

Autores

William S. Reeder,

Tópico(s)

Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

Resumo

Vietnam: General Vo Nguyen Giap The Global War on Terrorism is a 21st-century conflict, but as the United States finds itself engaged in counterinsurgency operations, it is useful to look back at past experiences to see if lessons might be gleaned to inform at least some of our actions in the months and possibly years ahead. One obvious place to turn is the Vietnam War. There is no dearth of information written on that conflict. Indeed, there is far more information available than can reasonably be digested. Nonetheless, as Americans seek a better understanding of the experience in Vietnam, and specifically attempt to draw lessons that might apply to combating insurgents and other asymmetric foes, it is helpful to gain the perspective views of enemy combatants, key planners, and leaders on the opposing side. Undoubtedly, the greatest military figure from modern Vietnamese history is Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap commanded Vietnamese forces that defeated the French during the First Indochina War and was the Minister of Defense during the U.S. fight in Vietnam. Giap's book, General Vo Nguyen Giap: The General Headquarters in the Spring of Brilliant Victory (The Gioi Publishers, Hanoi, 2002), has been translated into English and provides a ready source of information on Giap's view of the final phases of that conflict. Giap's memoir is a mixture of historical data, personal interpretation, and regrettably, propaganda. The reader must constantly be alert to understand which is being conveyed at any given time. This is not to dismiss the work out of hand because of this deficiency. Quite the contrary. The recounting of historical events from the North Vietnamese viewpoint is insightful. The perspectives Giap provides on the workings of North Vietnam's state, party, and military apparatus brings the reader much closer to an understanding of how this arcane and seemingly inept communist system was able to plan, organize, and prosecute a victorious war against the mightiest power on earth. However, the reader must carefully guard against the unchallenged acceptance of any portion of the narrative that intends to diminish the South Vietnamese or the Americans or to advance the political, military, or moral position of the North. Not that any of these positions could not otherwise be carried by sound argument supported by verifiable data. It is just that Giap does not do so and often puts forth erroneous data that is easy to refute. Giap's memoirs recount the U.S. Christmas bombing campaign of 1972 that preceded the signing of the Paris Peace Accords ending U.S. involvement in the war in January 1973. He then highlights the agenda and decisions of the 21st Plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee that laid down the outline for the continuance of the war, in spite of the Paris Peace Accords, to ultimate communist victory. The remainder of the book focuses on how the Plenum's decisions evolved in form and detail and how the resulting campaign was executed through the final collapse of the South Vietnamese regime. Two chapters, Fundamental and Opportunity Plan and Making Strategic Decisions, are the most insightful. They show Giap as a student of history, acknowledging the influence of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte while quickly adding the importance of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and Cuban President Fidel Castro as well. Here Giap discusses the interrelationship of the party, the army, and the state in developing the strategy for the postU.S. departure offensive that would overwhelm the South. Giap also gives some insight, and possibly exaggerated credit, to the relationship between North Vietnamese officials and those of the remnants of the insurgency in the South. He cites lessons learned from one of the few admitted North Vietnamese failures-the 1972 Easter Offensive-and then describes a process of an evolving position of consensus between the three elements of national power as the plan moved from concept to maturity. …

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