Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases

1982; Cambridge University Press; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1017/cbo9780511809477.002

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman,

Forecasting Techniques and Applications

Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as “I think that …,” “chances are …,” “it is unlikely that …,” and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the probability of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity? This article shows that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.