Artigo Acesso aberto Revisado por pares

Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting Attack in Practical Quantum Cryptography

2005; American Physical Society; Volume: 94; Issue: 23 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1103/physrevlett.94.230503

ISSN

1092-0145

Autores

Xiang‐Bin Wang,

Tópico(s)

Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture

Resumo

We propose an efficient method to verify the upper bound of the fraction of counts caused by multiphoton pulses in practical quantum key distribution using weak coherent light, given whatever type of Eve's action. The protocol simply uses two coherent states for the signal pulses and vacuum for the decoy pulse. Our verified upper bound is sufficiently tight for quantum key distribution with a very lossy channel, in both the asymptotic and nonasymptotic case. So far our protocol is the only decoy-state protocol that works efficiently for currently existing setups.

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