Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-ethics: The Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments
2015; University of Hawaii Press; Volume: 65; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1353/pew.2015.0071
ISSN1529-1898
Autores Tópico(s)Indian and Buddhist Studies
ResumoWhether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments is investigated here. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010–2011), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This claim is contested here with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Several arguments are provided to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily justify their moral judgments by appeal to the notion of conventional truth.
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