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Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers

2012; Wiley; Volume: 86; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00578.x

1933-1592

John Bengson,

Philosophy and History of Science

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 86, Issue 3 p. 495-532 Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers John Bengson, John Bengson University of Wisconsin, MadisonSearch for more papers by this author John Bengson, John Bengson University of Wisconsin, MadisonSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 June 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00578.xCitations: 42Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References Alexander, J. and J. Weinberg2007. Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy. 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