Artigo Acesso aberto Revisado por pares

Substitutes for legal protection: corporate governance and dividends in Victorian Britain1

2010; Wiley; Volume: 64; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1468-0289.2010.00545.x

ISSN

1468-0289

Autores

Gareth Campbell, John D. Turner,

Tópico(s)

Historical Economic and Social Studies

Resumo

The Economic History ReviewVolume 64, Issue 2 p. 571-597 Substitutes for legal protection: corporate governance and dividends in Victorian Britain† GARETH CAMPBELL, GARETH CAMPBELL Queen's University BelfastSearch for more papers by this authorJOHN D. TURNER, JOHN D. TURNER Queen's University BelfastSearch for more papers by this author GARETH CAMPBELL, GARETH CAMPBELL Queen's University BelfastSearch for more papers by this authorJOHN D. TURNER, JOHN D. TURNER Queen's University BelfastSearch for more papers by this author First published: 12 April 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2010.00545.xCitations: 59Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract Companies in Victorian Britain operated in a laissez-faire legal environment from the perspective of outside investors, implying that such investors were not protected by the legal system. 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