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Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality

2012; Wiley; Volume: 66; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/1746-8361.12007

1746-8361

Don Fallis,

Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

DialecticaVolume 66, Issue 4 p. 563-581 Original Article Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality Don Fallis, Don Fallis fallis@email.arizona.edu School of Information Resources, University of Arizona, USASearch for more papers by this author Don Fallis, Don Fallis fallis@email.arizona.edu School of Information Resources, University of Arizona, USASearch for more papers by this author First published: 20 December 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12007Citations: 22Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you assert what you believe to be false with the intent to deceive. However, several philosophers (e.g., Carson 2006, Sorensen 2007, Fallis 2009) have pointed out that there are lies that are not intended to deceive and, thus, that the traditional definition fails. In 2009, I suggested an alternative definition: you lie if and only if you say what you believe to be false when you believe that one of Paul Grice's conversational norms (“Do not say what you believe to be false”) is in effect. Faulkner (forthcoming), Stokke (forthcoming), and Pruss (2012) have subsequently argued that my 2009 definition fails as well because it counts some statements that are clearly not lies as being lies. In this paper, I identify some additional counter-examples of this sort. But I argue that my 2009 definition can easily be revised to deal with such counter-examples once we clarify that the relevant norm is really against communicating something false rather than against merely saying it. Nevertheless, I show that even this revised version of my 2009 definition fails because it counts some statements that are lies as not being lies. Lies told by young children – which uncontroversially count as lies on the traditional philosophical definition – suggest that lying (as well as asserting in general) does not require believing that such a norm is in effect. Even so, I claim that, since all liars intend to do something that would violate this norm if it were in effect, there is a successful definition of lying that is at least in the spirit of my 2009 definition. Citing Literature Volume66, Issue4December 2012Pages 563-581 RelatedInformation