Artigo Revisado por pares

Aquinas on the Past Possibility of the World's Having Existed Forever

1994; Philosophy Education Society Inc.; Volume: 48; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

ISSN

2154-1302

Autores

Ian Wilks,

Tópico(s)

Medieval and Classical Philosophy

Resumo

THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE on Aquinas' De aeternitate mundi is considerable;(1) the controversy which has spawned it seems have involved two major points of dispute. First there is the problem of dating the work; while some commentators believe it have been written at an earlier stage in Aquinas' career--in the 1250s--the majority view is that it is a much later work, written in the early 1270s.(2) Second, there is the problem of the continuity of doctrine between this work and the other texts Aquinas has left us on the issue of the world's temporal duration. Does he propose the same position in all, or does De aeternitate mundi represent a departure?(3) These two points of dispute come together when scholars discuss the historical context of this work. Thomas Bukowski sees it as an early defence of an unchanging position against the attacks of Bonaventure;(4) Ignatius Brady sees it as a late defence of an unchanging position against the attacks of John Pecham.(5) John Wippel, by contrast, takes it as a late departure from a previous view,(6) and James Weisheipl, concurring with Wippel, attributes this change Aquinas' study of Aristotle's Physics in the period before his second Paris regency.(7) My chief interest here is consider the second of the above issues: what is the doctrinal relation between the argument of De aeternitate mundi and the arguments of parallel texts elsewhere among the writings of Aquinas? My conclusions on this score are presented and argued in the opening half of part 2 of this paper; the remainder of part 2 is given over discussion of the wider issue of the work's historical context. In part 1, however, I begin my discussion with a reasonably detailed reading of the crucial opening passages of De aeternitate mundi(8)--a reading on which will be based much of what I have say in the ensuing part. I Aquinas is careful about the way he uses the word (aeternitas) in the body of the text; its occurrence, in fact, is all but limited the title.(9) Instead, he uses the phrase to have existed forever; for the world have existed forever is for it have had infinitely extended temporal duration--or, more simply, for it have been without a beginning.(10) Aquinas is, both in DA and elsewhere, quite explicit, and consistent, in maintaining that having infinitely extended temporal duration is not the same as being eternal.(11) Strictly speaking, then, Aquinas is not talking about the world's eternity or noneternity (the title of this work notwithstanding); he is talking, rather, about its infinite, or finite, temporal duration. I shall accordingly make a point of following, where possible, Aquinas' own locution: to have existed It is important at the outset be very clear about the position Aquinas is actually trying establish. It is suggested in the opening sentence of DA: If we suppose, in accord with Catholic faith, that the world had a beginning of its duration, the question arises whether it could have existed forever.(12) The question is clearly a modal one. The question as whether the world has existed forever or not is settled by the Catholic faith: it has not existed forever. The question Aquinas intends pursue is weaker: could it have existed forever? We should note the exact language of this question. The Latin reads: Dubitatio mota est utrum semper fuisse.(13) The utrum--whether--introduces an indirect question; the verb of this question--potuerit--is accordingly inflected the subjunctive mood. What is interesting is that it is also inflected the perfect form of the subjunctive, not the present; possit would introduce a present-tensed possibility, and the question would be whether the world is able have existed always. However, potuerit is used instead of possit, and introduces a past-tensed possibility; the question is therefore whether the world was able have existed always. …

Referência(s)