THE SKEPTIC AND THE NAÏVE REALIST
2011; Wiley; Volume: 21; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00204.x
ISSN1758-2237
Autores Tópico(s)Classical Philosophy and Thought
ResumoPhilosophical IssuesVolume 21, Issue 1 p. 268-288 THE SKEPTIC AND THE NAÏVE REALIST Heather Logue, Heather Logue University of Leeds 1Search for more papers by this author Heather Logue, Heather Logue University of Leeds 1Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 October 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00204.xCitations: 6Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Brewer, B. 2008. How to account for illusion. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0007 Web of Science®Google Scholar Byrne, A. 2004. How hard are the sceptical paradoxes? Nous 38: 299–325. 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00471.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Byrne, A. forthcoming. Knowing what I see. Introspection and Consciousness, ed. D. Smithies and D. Stoljar. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Byrne, A., and H. Logue. 2008. Either/Or. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0003 Web of Science®Google Scholar Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0199243816.001.0001 Google Scholar Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.001.0001 Google Scholar Gertler, B. 2000. The mechanics of self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 28: 125–46. 10.5840/philtopics200028215 Google Scholar Johnston, M. 2006. Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awareness. Perceptual Experience, ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0008 Web of Science®Google Scholar Kennedy, M. 2010. Naive Realism and experiential evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110: 77–109. 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00280.x Google Scholar Kennedy, M. forthcoming. Naive Realism, privileged access, and epistemic safety. Nous. Google Scholar Logue, H. ms. Naive Realism's sophisticated account of veridical experience. Google Scholar Martin, M. G. F. 2004. The limits of self-awareness. Philosophical Studies 120: 37–89. 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033751.66949.97 Web of Science®Google Scholar Martin, M. G. F.. 2006. On being alienated. Perceptual Experience, ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0011 Google Scholar McDowell, J. 2008. The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0017 Google Scholar Millar, A. 2008. Perceptual-recognitional abilities and perceptual knowledge. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0015 Google Scholar Pritchard, D. 2008. McDowellian neo-Mooreanism. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0013 Google Scholar Snowdon, P. F. 2005. The formulation of disjunctivism: a response to Fish. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 129–41. 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00106.x Google Scholar Vogel, J. 2004. Skeptical arguments. Philosophical Issues 14: 426–55. 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00037.x Google Scholar Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Citing Literature Volume21, Issue1October 2011Pages 268-288 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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