Can Animals Judge?
2010; Wiley; Volume: 64; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01227.x
ISSN1746-8361
Autores Tópico(s)Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
ResumoDialecticaVolume 64, Issue 1 p. 11-33 Can Animals Judge? Hans-Johann Glock, Hans-Johann Glock Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zürichbergstrasse 43, CH-8044 Zurich, Switzerland; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Hans-Johann Glock, Hans-Johann Glock Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zürichbergstrasse 43, CH-8044 Zurich, Switzerland; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 28 April 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01227.xCitations: 14Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract This article discusses the problems which concepts pose for the attribution of thoughts to animals. It locates these problems within a range of other issues concerning animal minds (section 1), and presents a 'lingualist master argument' according to which one cannot entertain a thought without possessing its constituent concepts and cannot possess concepts without possessing language (section 2). The first premise is compelling if one accepts the building-block model of concepts as parts of wholes – propositions – and the idea that intentional verbs signify relations between subjects and such propositions. But I shall find fault with both (section 3). This opens the way for recognizing a form of 'holodoxastic' thought-ascription which does not presuppose concept-possession on the part of the subject (section 4). Section 5 defends this idea against objections. Section 6 turns to the second premise of the lingualist master argument. I press the idea of judgement into service as a label for conceptual thought that need not be linguistic and argue that the possession of concepts is an ability. Section 7 accepts that concept-possession requires the ability to classify rather than merely to discriminate, but suggests that this need not disqualify animals. In the final section I confirm this verdict by returning to the notion of judgement: classification is the deliberate and considered response to a range of options in a sorting or discrimination task. Notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, the capacity for such a response does not presuppose the linguistic ability to answer questions. Judgement is a feature of a type of problem-solving that we share with some non-linguistic creatures. References Allen, C. 1999, 'Animal Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-Monitoring as an Empirical Approach', Erkenntnis 51, pp. 33–40. Allen, C. and Hauser, M. 1996, ' Concept Attribution in Nonhuman Animals: Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Ascribing Complex Mental Processes', in: M. Bekoff and D. Jamieson, eds, Readings in Animal Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 47–62. Bermúdez, J. 2003, Thinking without Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cussins, A. 1992, 'Content, Embodiment and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails', Mind 101, pp. 651–688. Davidson, D. 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. 1985, ' Rational Animals', in: E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, eds, Actions and Events, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 473–480. Davidson, D. 1992, 'Davidson, Donald', in: S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 231–236. Davidson, D. 1997, 'Seeing Through Language', in: J. Preston, ed., Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–27. DeGrazia, D. 1996, Taking Animals Seriously, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dretske, F. 2004, 'Seeing, Believing and Knowing', in: R. Schwartz, ed., Perception, Malden: Blackwell, pp. 268–286. Dummett, M. 1993, Origins of Analytical Philosophy, London: Duckworth. Dupré, J. 1996, 'The Mental Lives of Nonhuman Animals', in: M. Bekoff and D. Jamieson, eds, Readings in Animal Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 323–336. Frege, G. 19181919, 'Negation'. Reprinted in M. Beaney, ed., 1997, The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. Frege, G. 1969, Nachgelassene Schriften, Hamburg: Meiner. Geach, P.T. 1957, Mental Acts, London: RKP. Glock, H. J. 2003, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glock, H. J. 2009a, 'Can Animals Act for Reasons? Inquiry 52, pp. 232–255. Glock, H. J. 2009b, 'Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong', Philosophy 84, pp. 5–29. Glock, H. J. 2010, ' Concepts; between the Subjective and the Objective', in: J. Cottingham and P. M. S. Hacker, eds, Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 306–329. Hacker, P. M. S. 2001, 'An Orrery of Intentionality', Language and Communication 21, pp. 119–141. Herman, L. M. 2006, 'Intelligence and Rational Behaviour in the Bottlenosed Dolphin', in: S. Hurley and M. Nudds, eds, Rational Animals, pp. 439–468. Hurley, S. 2006, 'Making Sense of Animals', in: S. Hurley and M. Nudds, eds, Rational Animals, pp. 139–171. Kenny, A. J. P. 1963, Action, Emotion and Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Kenny, A. J. P. 1975, Will, Freedom and Power, Oxford: Blackwell. Kenny, A. J. P. 1989, The Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. McDowell, J. 1996, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Malcolm, N. 19721973, 'Thoughtless Brutes', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Society 46, pp. 5–20. Marcus, E. forthcoming, 'Knowledgeable Brutes. Peacocke, C. 1992, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pepperberg, I. M. 2006, 'Intelligence and Rationality in Parrots', in: S. Hurley and M. Nudds, eds, Rational Animals, pp. 469–488. Price, H. H. 1953, Thinking and Experience, London, Hutchinson. Rundle, B. 1997, Mind in Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rundle, B. 2001, 'Objects and Attitudes', Language and Communication 21, pp. 143–156. Savage-Rumbaugh, S. 1986, Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to Symbol, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stephan, A. 1999, 'Are Animals Capable of Concepts? Erkenntnis 51, pp. 79–92. Tomasello, M. and Call, J. 1997, Primate Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tugendhat, E. 1982, Traditional and Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tugendhat, E. 1986, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Vendler, Z. 1972, Res Cogitans, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wettstein, H. 2004, The Magic Prism, New York: Oxford University Press. White, A. 1972, ' What We Believe', in N. Rescher, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series 6 ), Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 69–84. White, T. I. 2007, In Defense of Dolphins, Oxford: Blackwell. Citing Literature Volume64, Issue1Special Issue: Concepts. Guest Editor: Elisabetta LalumeraMarch 2010Pages 11-33 ReferencesRelatedInformation
Referência(s)