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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility

1969; Philosophy Documentation Center; Volume: 66; Issue: 23 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/2023833

1939-8549

Harry G. Frankfurt,

Theology and Philosophy of Evil

A dominant role in nearly all recent inquiries into the free-will problem has been played by a principle which the author shall call ‘the principle of alternate possibilities.’ This principle states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible. In seeking illustrations of the principle of alternate possibilities, it is most natural to think of situations in which the same circumstances both bring it about that a person does something and make it impossible for him to avoid doing it. The two main concepts employed in the principle of alternate possibilities are ‘morally responsible’ and ‘could have done otherwise.’ To discuss the principle without analyzing either of these concepts may well seem like an attempt at piracy.