The fiscal body of sovereignty: to ‘make live’ in Indian country
2015; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 6; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/2201473x.2015.1090525
ISSN2201-473X
Autores Tópico(s)Indian Economic and Social Development
ResumoABSTRACTFiscal relations between the state and Indigenous peoples in Canada are a matter of life and death. By bringing to light techniques of economic rationality and governance of Indigenous peoples, this paper demonstrates a vital, yet overlooked trajectory in an ongoing colonial war. I examine specifically how Canada investigated and intentionally distorted Attawapiskat Chief Theresa Spence's band finances as a way to discredit her demands that governments respect her community's treaty rights. Further, I will analyze how these economic mechanisms and discourses functioned to ‘settle’ Indigenous territorial demands for self-determination in order for states and private industry to gain valuable access to Indigenous lands and resources. A multi-million dollar De Beers diamond mine operates 90 kilometers west of the Attawapiskat reserve and serves as an important site for examining how colonial forms of fiscal warfare work. For the past two centuries, an expectation of ‘self-sufficiency’ has been demanded from Indigenous peoples in tension with state investment in the dispossession of Indigenous lands; this tension defines Crown-Indigenous fiscal relations to this day and has been amplified recently in public discourses demanding accountability and transparency from Indigenous peoples while simultaneously decrying their dependency on the state. These discourses have developed in distinct relation to the conjoined historical and structural imperatives of settler colonial governance: territorial possession and resource access. I propose that by surveying the recent economic history of a resource periphery such as Attawapiskat First Nation, we may examine the kinds of power invested and produced in governing the lives and deaths of Indigenous peoples in Canada today. Notes on contributorShiri Pasternak is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies at Columbia University. She holds a PhD from the Department of Geography at the University of Toronto. She is a member of the Indigenous Sovereignty and Solidarity and Defenders of the Land networks.Notes1 Ipsos, ‘Fast Fallout: Chief Spence and Idle No More Movement Galvanizes Canadians Around Money Management and Accountability’, Tuesday, January 15, 2013.2 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures of the College de France, 1975-76 (New York: Picador, 1997).3 For accounts of this historical process of ‘perfection’, see Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia 1788–1835 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires 1400–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).4 Audra Simpson, ‘The Disappeared Corporealities of Native Women: Femicide in Canadian Law and Policy’, Presentation, New York University, September 22, 2014.5 Audra Simpson, ‘Multicultural Settler Sovereignty’, Presentation, Native American Indigenous Studies Association, University of Saskatoon, June 15, 2013.6 Attawapiskat First Nation v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2012 FC 948, at para 12.7 Attawapiskat First Nation v. Canada, 2012 FC 146, at para 18.8 Rita Poliakov, ‘Government “didn't know how to deal with us”, says Louttit’, Sudbury Star, Friday, March 16, 2012. Aboriginal Affairs authorized the band to withdraw a further $350,000 from existing funding. But in both cases, Canada was simply permitting the band to borrow money against its own funds and did not provide additional funding.9 CBC reported the figure to be $84 million (‘Attawapiskat finances put under 3rd-party control’, November 30, 2011).10 Attawapiskat First Nation v. Canada, 2012 FC 146, at para 24.11 Gloria Galloway, ‘Tories take Attawapiskat finances out of native hands’, Globe and Mail, Wednesday, November 30, 2011.12 Galloway, ‘Tories take Attawapiskat finances out of native hands'.13 Attawapiskat First Nation v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2012 FC 948 at para 20.14 APTN, ‘Chiefs Rally Around Attawapiskat as Call Issued for Oil Pipeline Blockade in Three Provinces’, National News, December 7, 2011.15 CTVNews.ca Staff, ‘Attawapiskat Can't Block Third-Party Manager: Court’, February 3, 2012.16 Crawford Kilian, ‘Attawapiskat Seeks Injunction Against Third-Party Manager’, The Tyee, January 28, 2012. This article quotes directly from Attawapiskat's interlocutory injunction. These court documents were once published on Attawapiskat First Nation's website, but have since been removed.17 CBC News, ‘Attawapiskat Receives First Modular Home’, February 12, 2012.18 Though this unaccountability may have escaped public scrutiny, the Auditor General of Canada (AGC) has reported on precisely this problem. Assessing TPM, she writes: ‘The Region We Visited Had No Results-Based Management and Accountability Framework in Place' (para 10.32, p. 10) (Canada, Minister of Public Works and Government Services, ‘Report of the Auditor General of Canada: November 2003)’. The figure I cite regarding accountants’ salaries appeared in: CBC News, 'Attawapiskat's 3rd-Party Manager to Be Withdrawn’, April 5, 2012. The AGC Report confirms the likelihood of this figure, reporting that ‘in the region visited, the third-party managers charged between $195,000 to $312,000 per year for fees, which are paid from the First Nations' funding' (para 10.29, p. 9).19 APTN, ‘Chiefs Rally Around Attawapiskat’, emphasis added.20 For further reading on the residential school legacy, see J.R. Miller, Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1996); and, Constance Deiter, From Our Mothers’ Arms: The Intergenerational Impact of Residential Schools in Saskatchewan (Toronto, ON: United Church, 1999).21 Supplementary Affidavit of Chief Theresa Spence, Attawapiskat First Nation v. Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, Federal Court T-2037-11, January 14, 2012.22 At this juncture in 2012, undermining support for Chief Spence was likely conceived as a compound strategy to discredit a swell of Indigenous insurgency she helped to catalyze. Hundreds of demonstrations that winter had been provoked against the introduction of two legislative bills that contained amendments to multiple Acts, affecting First Nations treaty rights. For more on the Idle No More uprising, see Kino-nda-niimi Collective, eds., The Winter We Danced: Voices from the Past, the Future, and the Idle No More Movement (Winnipeg: ARP Books, 2014).23 Chief Theresa Spence and Elder Raymond Robinson, ‘Declaration of Commitment, First Nations: Working Towards Fundamental Change’, AFN News Communique.24 CBC, ‘Inside Attawapiskat's Financial Troubles’, January 9, 2013. The article states: ‘CBC News obtained a leaked copy of the report'.25 Deloitte & Touche LLP, Audit of the AANDC and Attawapiskat First Nation (AFN) Management Control Framework, Aboriginal and Northern Development Canada, September 28, 2012, 14.26 CBC Radio, ‘Attawapiskat Spending Report’, As It Happens, January 7, 2013.27 The audit notes that since Spence became chief in mid-2010, Deloitte found about a 15% improvement rate in documentation of accounting transactions (2010–2011 and part of 2011–2012).28 See, for example, Jordan Press, ‘Attawapiskat Audit Shows Questionable Spending Practices after Receiving More Than $100 Million in Federal Funding in Six Years’, National Post, January 7, 2013.29 Meagan Fitzpatrick, ‘Attawapiskat Handed Victory by Federal Court: Judicial Review Says a 3rd-Party Manager Was “Unreasonable” Fix to Housing Crisis’, CBC News, August 1, 2012.30 Attawapiskat First Nation v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2012 FC 948, at para 21. The Band was under ‘co-management' at the time, which is the stage of intervention prior to third party management. AANDC, therefore, would have been aware of the band's finances, having put in place expert resources to devise an action plan to prevent recurrences of defaults or debts.31 See Bruce Campion-Smith, ‘Aboriginal Affairs Officials Headed to Troubled Ontario Community’, Toronto Star, Friday, November 25, 2011; Ossie Michelin, ‘De Beers Decision to Dump Sewage into Attawapiskat Played Role in Current Housing Crisis’, APTN National News, December 13, 2011.32 Campion-Smith, ‘Aboriginal Affairs Officials'.33 Attawapiskat First Nation Band Council, ‘Attawapiskat Demands Respect for First Nation Rights and Entitlements’, Press Release, Toronto, August 20, 2009. See also James Thom, ‘Attawapiskat Homes Damaged by Sewage’, Wawatay News 36:16, August 6, 2009.34 Michelin, ‘De Beers Decision to Dump Sewage into Attawapiskat Played Role in Current Housing Crisis'. Michelin uncovers two engineering reports in particular: the first report was issued by the Ontario First Nations Technical Services Corporation on March 5, 2005 and the second by the First Nations Engineering Services Ltd on Oct. 13, 2006.35 Attawapiskat First Nation, ‘Statement by Attawapiskat Chief and Council on Notice of Third Party Intervention’, Press Release, December 1, 2011.36 Lorraine Land, ‘Taking a Second Look at Those Attawapiskat Numbers’, OKT Law Firm, December 13, 2011.37 Fiscal Realities Economists, ‘The True Cost of First Nation Government’, Kamloops, BC, 2001, 10.38 Michael Harris, ‘When Native Bashing Became Good Politics’, The Canadian Press, March 24, 2013.39 Ibid.40 Marilyn Strathern, Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy (London: Routledge, 2000), 2. Quoted in Leticia Barrera, ‘Performing the Court: Public Hearings and the Politics of Judicial Transparency in Argentina’, PoLAR 36, no. 2: 334.41 Strathern, Audit Cultures, 2. Quoted in Barrera, ‘Performing the Court’, 334.42 J.R. Miller, Lethal Legacy: Current Native Controversies in Canada (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 2004), 231.43 Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of the Indian Act (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), 3.44 Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep them Alive’: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873–1965 (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 8.45 For a good overview of these philosophies, see Robin Jarvis Brownlie, ‘A Persistent Antagonism: First Nations and the Liberal Order’, in Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, ed. Jean-François Constant and Michel Ducharme (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2009).46 Most prominent among the statutes promoting assimilation were the ‘enfranchisement and assimilation Acts,' that included: An Act for the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in This Province, and to Amend the Laws Respecting Indians, S.C. 1857, c. 26; An Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province, and to Amend the Laws Respecting Indians, S. Prov. C. 1857, c. 26; and, An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better Management of Indian Affairs, and to Extend the Provisions of the Act, 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, S.C. 1869, c. 6, s. 13.47 The Oliver Act was passed in 1911 permitting the federal government to relocate reserves situated next to growing municipalities. Between 1914 and 1930, greater access to Indian lands accrued to the deputy superintendent general of Indian Affairs, including new powers to transfer ‘dormant' agricultural lands on reserve to non-Indian farmers (see, Y. Belanger, D. Newhouse and H. Shpuniarsky, ‘The Evolution of Native Reserves’, in Indians in Contemporary Society, eds. G. Bailey, W. Sturtevant (Smithsonian Institution (US) 2008), 205.48 There are several good studies on barriers to Indigenous participation in the wage labour market. For a good place-based study, see, for example, Sarah Carter's authoritative research, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1990).49 Dean Neu, ‘“Presents” for the “Indians”: Land, Colonialism and Accounting in Canada’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 25 (2000): 164.50 Neu, ‘Presents’ for the ‘Indians’’, 181.51 For more on this relationship between accounting and colonization, see Dean Neu and Cameron Graham, ‘The Birth of a Nation: Accounting and Canada's First Nations, 1860–1890’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 31 (2006): 48. The term ‘permanent austerity' is one I develop in relation to fiscal techniques of colonization in Canada in a forthcoming article tentatively titled, ‘Permanent Austerity and Fiscal Brutality: How Land and Capital Mix in a Settler Colony'.52 Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep them Alive’, 9.53 Ibid., 22.54 An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians (Indian Act), S.C. 1876, c. 18, Sections 58–60.55 Neu and Graham, ‘The Birth of a Nation’, 59. On this point, the authors cite L. Tobias, ‘Protection, civilization, assimilation’, in As Long as the Sun Shines and the Water Flows, ed. I.A.L. Getty and A.S. Lussier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983), 47.56 Neu and Graham, ‘The Birth of a Nation’, 59.57 Assembly of First Nations, ‘The Indian Act: Protection, Control, or Assimilation? A Review of Crown Policy and Legislation, 1670–1996’, September 16, 1996. See, for example, legislation passed by Upper and Lower Canada in 1850, An act for the protection of Indians in Upper Canada from imposition and the property occupied by them from trespass and injury.58 Assembly of First Nations, ‘Fiscal Transfers, Programs & Services: The End of the Line? A Brief Survey of Crown-Indian Fiscal Relations’, September 17, 1996, 1.59 See, for example, R. Macdonald and R. Wolfe, ‘Canada's Third National Policy: The Epiphenomenal or the Real Constitution?' University of Toronto Law Journal 59 (2009); and L. Eden and M. Appel Molot, ‘Canada's National Policies: Reflections on 125 Years’, Canadian Public Policy 19, no. 3 (September 1993): 232–51.60 See, for example, Sharon Venne's work on Treaty 6: ‘Treaties Made in Good Faith’, in Natives and Settlers, Now and Then: Historical Issues and Current Perspectives on Treaties and Land Claims in Canada, ed. Paul W. DePasquale (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2007).61 Assembly of First Nations, ‘Fiscal Transfers, Programs & Services’, 1.62 Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48.63 Russell Diabo, ‘Federal Comprehensive Claims Policy vs. Recognition of Aboriginal Title and Rights’, Presentation, Carleton University, February 5, 2015.64 See, for example, critical writing on the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy, such as Andrew Woolford's, Between Justice and Certainty: Treaty Making in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).65 The Supreme Court of Canada recognized Aboriginal Title in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (in a theoretical sense) and Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.C. 44 (in a specific territorial sense), but in both cases ‘allowable infringements' to Aboriginal title may include the economic interests of third parties.66 Kathy Gibson, ‘Accounting as a Tool for Aboriginal Dispossession: Then and Now’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 13, no. 3 (2000): 289–306.67 For example, on September 4, 2012, the federal government announced a ‘results based' approach to Comprehensive Land Claims and Self-Government Agreements that made funding to First Nations contingent on a formula basis linked to own source revenue. These legislative initiatives benefit companies, but also serve as a divestment strategy for offloading the financial burden of Crown duties onto bands and the private sector.68 John Duncan, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, House of Commons, June 20, 2012.69 Government of Canada, Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development, 2009, Ottawa, Canada.70 Peter J. Usher, ‘Staple Production and Ideology in Northern Canada’, in Culture, Communication and Dependency: The Tradition of H.A. Innis, ed. William H. Melody, Liora Salter and Paul Heyer (New Jersey: Ablex, 1981).71 Timothy Mitchell, ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics’, The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March 1991), emphasis in original, 90.72 CTF, ‘New Jaw Dropping Reserve Pay Numbers’, Press Release, November 21, 2010.73 Assembly of First Nations (AFN), ‘The Straight Goods on First Nations Salaries’, Wednesday, December 14, 2010.74 The CTF timed their report to coincide with the introduction of an earlier iteration of the bill, Bill C-575, which was introduced in October 2010 but died on the Order Paper when the federal election was called on 26 March 2011. According to a CTF Press Release, ‘Kelly Block Tabled Her Bill in Response to Numerous Cases Where the CTF Helped Band Members Blow the Whistle on Sky-High Politicians’ Salaries' (March 3, 2011, ‘Aboriginal Politician Salary Disclosure One Step Closer to Law’, Accessed online July 17, 2014: http://www.taxpayer.com/news-releases/aboriginal-politician-salary-disclosure-one-step-closer-to-law).75 See a summary of these statutory rules here: Tonina Simeone, Shauna Troniak, ‘Legislative Summary of Bill C-27: An Act to enhance the financial accountability and transparency of First Nations, January 7, 2013 Publication Number 41-1-C27-E.76 Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons, November 2003.77 Ibid.78 See Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 5 Management of Programs for First Nations, 2006; and Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 4 Programs for First Nations on Reserves to the House of Commons, 2011.79 Jennifer Henderson, ‘Transparency, Spectatorship, Accountability: Indigenous Families and Settler State ‘Postdemocracies’, English Studies in Canada 38, nos 3–4 (September/December 2012): 307.80 As Mark Milke of the right-wing think tank, Fraser Institute, put it, ‘Reserves like Attawapiskat run against the grain of [individual] opportunity' (quoted in Galloway, 2011).81 See, for example, Editorial, ‘Time to Shutter Attawapiskat Reserve’, Toronto Sun, May 5, 2013; and Raveena Aulakh, ‘Why Don't They Just Leave?' Toronto Star, December 29, 2012.82 Bruna Santarossa, ‘Diamonds: Adding Lustre to the Canadian Economy’, Analytical Paper, Statistics Canada, January 2004.83 Santarossa, ‘Diamonds’.84 See, for example, Christopher F. Schuetze, ‘Northern Canada, the Conflict-Free Diamond Frontier’, New York Times, September 11, 2014.85 Lindsay Alexandra Bell, ‘Diamonds as Development: Suffering for Opportunity in the Canadian North’ (Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2013), 75.86 Bell, ‘Diamonds as Development: Suffering for Opportunity in the Canadian North’, 32.87 See, for example, the report by the Conference Board of Canada (August 2010) Sustaining the Canadian Labour Force: Alternatives to Immigration. See also the new land claims policy, which states: ‘ … Aboriginal people represent the fastest-growing segment of the Canadian population, with close to 50% of the Aboriginal population under age 25. The interim policy links these demographics to opportunities for economic growth, prosperity, and job creation' (AANDC, A New Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, 2015, 4).88 Bell, ‘Diamonds as Development’, 31.89 Ontario Mining Association, ‘Together Against the Diamond Royalty’, The Northern Miner 93, no. 13 (May 21–27, 2007).90 For background on this treaty, see John Long, Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905 (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010).91 James Thom, ‘Attawapiskat Gives Thumbs up to Mining Project’, Wawatay News, July 14, 2005: Volume 32, Number 14.92 John Ivison, ‘Another Facet of Troubled Reserve; Attawapiskat Gets Hefty Diamond Mine Payments’, National Post (Canada), National Edition, December 7, 2011.93 For example, CBC News, ‘Attawapiskat Unrest Continues, Despite De Beers Investment Attawapiskat Residents Say Only a Fraction of Community Benefits from Mine's Prosperity’, February 05, 2013.94 Summaries of Draft Victor Diamond Project Impact Benefit Agreement Prepared Solely for the Members of Attawapiskat First Nation, October 2004, 5.95 CBC News, ‘Attawapiskat Unrest Continues, Despite De Beers Investment’, February 05, 2013.96 Jody Porter, ‘First Nations must “learn from” De Beers deal’, CBC News, February 13, 2013.97 De Beers, ‘Attawapiskat Impact Benefit Agreement Update’, January 2011.98 This figure was calculated assuming that revenues began accruing to the band in 2008, when the mine began commercial production. If the revenue sharing began immediately following the signing of the IBA, the percentage of De Beers gross revenue would be higher – around 3%. The trouble with both figures is that the gross revenue of the mine is based on De Beers’ self-reporting. Their gross revenue is likely much higher, so this should be considered a conservative estimate (Winfield, Coumans, Kuyek, Meloche, Taylor, ‘Looking Beneath the Surface: An Assessment of the Value of Public Support for the Metal Mining Industry in Canada’, Pembina Institute and Mining Watch Canada, 2002).99 See Table 3 – Features of Provincial/Territorial Mining Tax Regimes (as of December 10, 2013, Applicable to Fiscal Year 2013), Natural Resources Canada, Government of Canada, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/taxation/mining-taxation-regime/8890 (accessed May 8, 2015)100 The context in the North West Territories heaves particularly to this description. For further discussion regarding this geographic context, see Rebecca Hall shows: ‘Diamond Mining in Canada's Northwest Territories: A Colonial Continuity’, Antipode 45, no. 2 (2013): 376–93.101 IBAs are a legal mechanism that has become ubiquitous in resource deals between First Nations and the resource sector across Canada. They emerged in response to a growing jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights and title in the Supreme Court of Canada (see Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) 2004 SCC 73). The courts have determined that consultation with First Nations is required when development may infringe Aboriginal rights and that this consultation and subsequent accommodation is necessary even in the pre-proof stage of asserting Aboriginal title. While IBAs technically constitute a consultation process, since they imply consent from First Nations, these agreements contain confidential and non-compliance clauses that scholars refer to as a hostage situation of ‘indentured servants, who promise to work a certain number of years in exchange for their freedom, no matter how bad the working conditions' (see Ken Caine and Naomi Krogman, ‘Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit Sharing Agreements in Canada's North’, Organization and Environment 23, no. 1 (2010): 86).102 Doug Matthews, ‘Industry digs deep as it takes another stab at the Beaufort’, Up Here Business, July/August 2008, 66–7 quoted in Caine and Krogman, 90.103 Chris Nuttall-Smith, ‘The Saga of Victor Mine’, ON Nature, June 2006.104 Quoted in: John Ivison, ‘Another Facet of Troubled Reserve; Attawapiskat Gets Hefty Diamond Mine Payments’, National Post (Canada), National Edition, December 7, 2011.105 Tanya Li, ‘To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations’, Antipode 41, no. S1 (2009): 69.106 Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, ‘After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics’, Antipode 41, no. 1 (2009): 42.107 Deborah Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).108 Far North Science Advisory Panel, Science for a Changing Far North: The Report of the Far North Science Advisory Panel, April 2010, Queen's Printer for Ontario, Printed in Ontario, Canada, p. xiii.109 Northern Ontario Business, ‘Attawapiskat protests De Beers Canada’, August 20, 2009; Victoria Lean, ‘Ontario's First Nations Deserve More of the Diamond Industry's Cash’, Vice, April 11, 2013; CBC News, ‘Attawapiskat Unrest Continues, Despite De Beers Investment’, February 5, 2013.110 Jorge Barrera, ‘Attawapiskat Councillor Accuses De Beers of Trickery as Showdown Looms on Diamond Mine Ice Road,’ APTN National News, February 15, 2013.111 Ibid.112 De Beers Canada, Summaries of Draft Victor Diamond Project Impact Benefit Agreement Prepared Solely For The Members Of Attawapiskat First Nation, October 2004.113 Li, ‘To Make Live or Let Die?' 67.114 Ibid., 67–8, emphasis added.115 Scott Morgensen, ‘The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now’, Settler Colonial Studies 1 (2011): 56; Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 387–409.116 CBC News, ‘Harper vows “action” on Attawapiskat, Interim Liberal Party leader calls government's response “disgraceful”’, CBC Online, November 29, 2011.117 According to figures from the Indian Register, life expectancy at birth for Indians on reserve reflected differences of 8.1 years and 5.5 years, for males and females respectively, from the 2001 Canadian population's life expectancies (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2001, Basic Departmental Data 2001, Catalogue no. R12-7/2000E). Re: urban areas, see Martha Troian, ‘Aboriginal People in Toronto May Face Premature Death: Study’, CBC News, April 23, 2014.118 CBC News, ‘Attawapiskat Unrest Continues, Despite De Beers Investment’, February 5, 2013.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council [grant number 756-2013-0864].
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