THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
2010; Wiley; Volume: 41; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01665.x
ISSN1467-9973
Autores Tópico(s)American Constitutional Law and Politics
ResumoMetaphilosophyVolume 41, Issue 5 p. 669-689 THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM MICHAEL BUCKLEY, MICHAEL BUCKLEY Department of Philosophy, Lehman College, City University of New York, 250 Bedford Park Boulevard West, Bronx, NY 10468, USA[email protected]Search for more papers by this author MICHAEL BUCKLEY, MICHAEL BUCKLEY Department of Philosophy, Lehman College, City University of New York, 250 Bedford Park Boulevard West, Bronx, NY 10468, USA[email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 15 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01665.xCitations: 5Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract Abstract: In this article the author develops the view, held by some, that political constructivism is best interpreted as a pragmatic enterprise aiming to solve political problems. He argues that this interpretation's structure of justification is best conceived in terms of two separate investigations—one develops a normative solution to a particular political problem by working up into a coherent whole certain moral conceptions of persons and society; and the other is an empirically based analysis of the political problem. The author argues that the empirically based analysis can generate criteria for assessing whether the normative theory successfully works out a solution, thereby developing a functionalist structure of justification. 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