The Use of Collaborative Interfirm Contracts in the Presence of Task and Demand Uncertainty*
2011; Wiley; Volume: 28; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01124.x
ISSN1911-3846
AutoresRanjani Krishnan, Fabienne Miller, Karen L. Sedatole,
Tópico(s)Sharing Economy and Platforms
ResumoContemporary Accounting ResearchVolume 28, Issue 4 p. 1397-1422 The Use of Collaborative Interfirm Contracts in the Presence of Task and Demand Uncertainty* Ranjani Krishnan, Ranjani Krishnan Michigan State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorFabienne Miller, Fabienne Miller Worcester Polytechnic InstituteSearch for more papers by this authorKaren Sedatole, Karen Sedatole Michigan State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Ranjani Krishnan, Ranjani Krishnan Michigan State UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorFabienne Miller, Fabienne Miller Worcester Polytechnic InstituteSearch for more papers by this authorKaren Sedatole, Karen Sedatole Michigan State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 October 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01124.xCitations: 28 † Accepted by Margaret Abernethy. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2010 Contemporary Accounting Research Conference, generously supported by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. We thank two anonymous reviewers, Margaret Abernethy (Associate Editor), Wai Fong Chua (Contemporary Accounting Research Conference discussant), Raffi Indjejikian, Ella Mae Matsumura, Michal Matejka, Venky Nagar, Steven Salterio, Vallabh Sambamurthy, Geoff Sprinkle, participants of the 2008 Management Accounting Research Conference of the American Accounting Association and of the 2010 CAR Conference and workshop participants at Indiana University, Maastricht University, Michigan State University, University of Michigan, and the University of Southern California. This research was supported by the Center for the Leadership of the Digital Enterprise (CLODE) at the Broad School of Business, Michigan State University. We also thank our research partners for their assistance. 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