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Russian nationalism and Ukraine: the nationality policy of the volunteer army during the Civil War

1996; Association of College and Research Libraries; Volume: 33; Issue: 09 Linguagem: Inglês

10.5860/choice.33-5286

1943-5975

Rex A. Wade,

Polish Historical and Cultural Studies

Anna Procyk. Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1995. xvi, 202 pp. Bibliography. Index. $39.95, cloth. Anna Procyk's intriguing study focuses on the policies of the Volunteer Army, especially its nationality policy as it applied to the various Ukrainian governments. Her conclusion is that the main objective of Generals Alexeev and Denikin and of the Volunteer Army was the preservation of the unity of the Russian state and the regeneration of Russia as a great power. Other objectives, including even the immediate defeat of the Bolsheviks, took second place. This focus helps to explain some of the military decisions of the Civil War. It also explains why it was impossible for Denikin to ally with Ukrainian or other nationality forces at key junctures in 1918 and 1919 if the Ukrainians in even the most modest way-such as demanding federalism or cultural autonomy-refused to accept the preservation of a unitary Russian state. Indeed, the Volunteer Army's steadfast rejection of a federal structure for a re-created Russian state is one of the main themes of the book. Viewed thus, the various nationality governments and armies, including all Ukrainian forces, whether conservative or socialist, were equally enemies with the Bolsheviks. For the leaders of the Volunteer Army, the social content of a government was irrelevant compared to its state content; they opposed the conservative government of Hetman Skoropadsky as much as the socialist Ukrainian governments because both supported separatism or autonomy. The Volunteer Army's task initially was to maintain a Russian army and keep alive the principle of a unitary Russian state allied with the Entente and contributing to the defeat of Germany. The Bolsheviks and nationalists were seen as mere clients of Germany, certain to collapse with the latter's defeat. However, Germany's surrender in November 1918 did not change Denikin's attitude toward the nationalities who were seen as continuing Germany's plan for Russia's dismemberment. There is an eerie similarity to contemporary Russian nationalists who see in the national aspirations of Ukrainians, Georgians and others a foreign-United States-plan for dismemberment of the Russian/USSR state. Denikin and the Volunteer Army were supported in their approach by some Russian liberals, who had become fervent nationalists themselves during the war, revolution and civil war. Indeed, they saw Russian culture as the glue which held the state together; federalism or any extensive cultural autonomy would only lead to the unraveling of the state. …