Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations*
2012; Wiley; Volume: 84; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00566.x
ISSN1933-1592
Autores Tópico(s)Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
ResumoPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 84, Issue 3 p. 513-530 Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations* SINAN DOGRAMACI, SINAN DOGRAMACI The University of Texas at Austin I pronounce it, when speaking English, like this: sin·on dor·uh·mudge·uh.Search for more papers by this author SINAN DOGRAMACI, SINAN DOGRAMACI The University of Texas at Austin I pronounce it, when speaking English, like this: sin·on dor·uh·mudge·uh.Search for more papers by this author First published: 03 February 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00566.xCitations: 41 † Editor's note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology Conference in 2011. 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