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The Changing Role of Central Banks and the Role of Competition in Financial Regulation during (and in the Aftermath of) the Financial Crisis

2011; Wiley; Volume: 17; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00563.x

1468-0386

Marianne Ojo,

Global Financial Regulation and Crises

European Law JournalVolume 17, Issue 4 p. 513-533 The Changing Role of Central Banks and the Role of Competition in Financial Regulation during (and in the Aftermath of) the Financial Crisis Marianne Ojo, Marianne Ojo Oxford Brookes University, School of Social Sciences and Law, Headington, Oxford Researcher, Oxford Brookes University, School of Social Sciences and Law, Headington, Oxford.Search for more papers by this author Marianne Ojo, Marianne Ojo Oxford Brookes University, School of Social Sciences and Law, Headington, Oxford Researcher, Oxford Brookes University, School of Social Sciences and Law, Headington, Oxford.Search for more papers by this author First published: 14 July 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00563.xCitations: 3 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract Rescue cases involving guarantees (contrasted with restructuring cases) during the recent Financial Crisis, have illustrated the prominent position that the goal of promoting financial stability has assumed over that of the prevention or limitation of possible distortions of competition which may arise when granting State aid. The importance attached to maintaining and promoting financial stability—as well as the need to facilitate rescue and restructuring measures aimed at preventing systemically relevant financial institutions from failure, demonstrate how far authorities are willing to overlook certain competition policies. However, increased government and central bank intervention also simultaneously trigger the usual concerns—which include moral hazard and the danger of serving as long-term substitutes for market discipline. How far central banks and governments should intervene and how far distortions of competition should be permitted ultimately depends on how systemically relevant a financial institution is. Citing Literature Volume17, Issue4July 2011Pages 513-533 RelatedInformation